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Title: Essays on Agent Heterogeneity and Adaptive Learning 
 
Agent heterogeneity has been a widely discussed topic in the recent decade. 
However, most of the models that emerged from the literature draw their conclusions 
from a rational expectations equilibrium. These models impose strong assumptions on 
what agents know and how much they understand the models operate from one period 
to the next. Adaptive learning offers a straightforward response to this criticism by 
assuming agents are econometric learners. My dissertation aims to investigate the 
implications of combining these two features – agent heterogeneity and adaptive 
learning – together to see how models behave differently from the traditional models. 
My research relaxes these rational expectation assumptions in several widely-studied 
macroeconomic models.  
In the first chapter of the dissertation, I traduce a novel concept of local 
rationality in a real business cycle model and with heterogeneous agents. The 
heterogeneity is introduced through ex-ante identical idiosyncratic income shocks.  To 
understand how heterogeneity plays a role in the result, I implement a series of 
experiments that include different versions of the model with representative agents 
and heterogeneous agents. Both rational expectation results and locally rational 
expectation results are obtained. Both chapters find novel results that aggregate 
variables behave differently under adaptive learning primarily due to wealth-rich 




equilibrium can be approximated with adaptive learning in these otherwise hard-to-
solve models.  
The last chapter focuses on a different type of heterogeneity with adaptive 
learning agents – expectational heterogeneity. The agents observe different signals to 
forecast relevant variables about the future. I show analytically that multiple sunspots 
can be used by agents in the model simultaneously, and these equilibria near an 
indeterminate steady state can still be E-stable. The analysis in the model holds for 
both the linear and the nonlinear versions of the model.  
Overall, my dissertation makes contributions in the intersection fields of agent-
heterogeneity and adaptive learning. The interaction could either be used as a 
computational method to approximate the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) or 
introduces extra friction in the model to have different aggregate responses given 
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Economic agents making forward-looking decisions is one of the major differences
between economics and natural sciences. In most modern economic theory, the
outcomes partially depend on what people expect to happen. The current standard
technique for modeling expectations is to assume rational expectations (RE).
Intuitively, Rational expectations define an equilibrium where reality and belief align
with each other. Formally, RE is defined as the conditional expectation of the
relevant model-specific variables. While RE provides an intuitive solution to most
macroeconomic models, the approach presumes that decision-makers have extensive
knowledge about the economy, including the models’ structure and the variables that
go into agents’ decision rules. These RE assumptions become even more stringent
when the relevant variables take the form of a distribution.
My research aims to relax these rational expectation assumptions in several
widely-studied macroeconomic models. I show that an alternative expectation
assumption, a.k.a adaptive learning, provides a deeper understanding of the rational
expectation assumptions imposed in several macroeconomic dynamic models. It
shows that adaptive learning can explain a range of empirical observations. All
chapters of my dissertation share the common ground in that I introduce some
bounded rationality to account for empirical evidence that full rationality fails.
My research is motivated by the fact that two individuals in the economy hardly
hold identical beliefs on the future outlook. Also, expectations are formed
with a certain level of irrationality because people do not have the necessary
information or understanding of how the economy operates. However, the most
1
recent macroeconomics development leaves out the discussions of expectations due
to increasing model complexity, albeit the relevant role expectations play in the
actual economy. In terms of applications, each chapter of the dissertation focus
on the following topics: the effects of monetary policies and economy-wide shocks
on consumption and income inequality in the United States, moment matching in
RBC models, stability of sunspot equilibrium with multiple sunspots, and zero-lower
bound on the interest rate and liquidity trap.
In the first chapter, a new behavioral concept, local rationality, is developed
within a simple heterogeneous-agent model with incomplete markets. To make savings
decisions, agents must forecast the shadow price of asset holdings. In the absence
of aggregate uncertainty, locally-rational agents predict shadow prices rationally
and make optimal state-contingent decisions. These agents then use estimated
econometric models to extend their rational shadow-price forecasts to accommodate
aggregate uncertainty. This chapter finds novel results that aggregate variables
behave differently under bounded rationality, primarily due to wealth-rich agents
learning behaviors. I introduce the local rationality concept in a real business cycle
model (RBC) to account for the second-moment fluctuations observed in the data.
The second chapter introduces local rationality to a New Keynesian economy
with incomplete markets and sticky nominal prices. Households are heterogeneous
and face idiosyncratic wage risks. Both aggregate productivity shocks and monetary
policy shocks are incorporated into the model. Both households and intermediate
goods producers are assumed to be locally rational because they make optimal state-
contingent decisions in the absence of aggregate uncertainties. Agents use estimated
econometric models to forecast their shadow prices to accommodate aggregate
uncertainties. In a calibrated model that attempts to capture features of US income
inequality, I implement multiple monetary and fiscal experiments. I show that the
aggregate responses to policies differ from their counterparts in a similar model with
2
entirely rational agents. I found that the interaction of agent heterogeneity and
adaptive learning can make aggregate shocks induce distributional effects. The effects
are driven mainly by the top-rich agents in the economy.
In the last chapter, I investigate the implication of introducing multiple finite-
state Markov extrinsic sunspot processes in a general univariate forward-looking
model. In this model, each agent either does not observe any sunspots or observes only
one of the sunspots. I show adaptively stable restricted perception Markov stationary
sunspot equilibria (RP-SSEs) can exist near an indeterminate steady state for both
the linear and nonlinear cases. I present the analytical conditions for the existence
and E-stability. I also show that the model would prefer a sunspot equilibrium to a





IN A REAL BUSINESS CYCLE MODEL
II.1 Introduction
Contemporary micro-founded macroeconomics models are identified partially by
the notion of rationality. A central aspect is that expectations can influence the
time path of the economy. Rationality is widely used in economic theories to ensure
internal consistency within the model. The equilibrium notion based on rationality
is a two-sided relationship where agents form expectations that lead to dynamics
that match their expectations. Rationality comes in two essential parts: i) knowing
the probability distribution of the endogenous and exogenous variables and can
form optimal forecasts, and ii) given these forecasts, agents make optimal choices
to maximize their objectives. The criticism is that the sophistication required of
agents by rationality is substantial.
Literature on bounded rationality and adaptive learning has developed to
respond to the criticism of rational agents’ knowledge of the model structure. Instead
of knowing the data generating process, agents act like econometricians and estimate
forecasting models to form expectations. In turn, the boundedly rational expectations
feedback into the dynamic system and generate new data for the agents to update their
models. However, there hasn’t been much exploration on the criticism that comes
4
with agents making the optimal decision by solving infinite-horizon programming
problems. The pioneering work of Evans and McGough (2020) first introduced
shadow-price learning as a behavior primitive as a response to the criticism on the
optimal decisions. Informally, agents are assumed to act as if they solve a two-
period optimization problem in each period and forecast ”shadow prices” to trade-off
between choices today and the impact tomorrow. Shadow price learning turns a
complex dynamic control optimization problem into a forecasting problem closely
linked to bounded rationality and adaptive learning.
The agents’ sophistication level becomes even higher when the model deviates
from the representative-agent setting to a heterogeneous-agent one. In a
representative-agent model, all agents would act identically and hence know
everyone makes the same decisions in each period. However, in a model with
heterogeneous agents, rational expectations assume agents know the state variables’
whole distribution and how it translates to prices. As a more realistic modeling
strategy than the traditional presentative-agent models, heterogeneous-agent models
have attracted a lot of attention in the literature. For example, Philip Bergmann
(2020) finds that energy price shocks decrease inequalities for both income and wealth
in a real business cycle (RBC) model with heterogeneous agents. New results have
been found through the lens of the HANK model. Kaplan et al. (2018) find that
the indirect effects of an unexpected decrease in interest rates operating through a
general equilibrium increase in labor demand outweigh the direct effects of inter-
temporal substitution. McKay et al. (2016) find the power of forward guidance
smaller in a HANK model than in the standard model. Bhandari et al. find that
the Ramsey planner’s optimal policy responses differ from the representative agent
economy in magnitudes and directions. However, findings are drawn from a rational
expectation equilibrium and impose strong assumptions on agents’ knowledge about
the economy’s structure and the law of motions of some large-dimension states.
5
This chapter intends to relax this strong assumption on the agent’s ability to
solve the dynamic optimization problem by introducing local rationality in a dynamic
model. Local rationality assumes that agents can make fully optimal decisions under
idiosyncratic shocks in the absence of aggregate uncertainty. However, agents do not
know the equilibrium mapping from the economy’s aggregate states to the distribution
of state variables and market-clearing prices. The rationality is local in the sense that,
to account for the aggregate shocks, agents use an econometric model as guidance
for deviating from the fully optimal decisions in the absence of aggregate uncertainty.
The aggregate states and individual household’s beliefs determine the direction and
magnitude of the deviations. In this environment, agents form beliefs based on
idiosyncratic shocks paths and react differently to aggregate shocks.
Under local rationality, the economy is self-referential: the shifts in individual
beliefs determine the new distribution of beliefs, combined with labor productivity
and asset holdings distributions, affect current market-clearing conditions. The
market-clearing conditions, in turn, reinforce the individual beliefs. A prominent
unique feature of our environment is that the interaction of learning and idiosyncratic
shock dynamics plays a significant role in expectation formation. Mainly, learning
introduces a parameter that governs the speed of agents’ updating of their econometric
models. When the speed is low, households spend a relatively long time updating
the forecast rule. During the same periods, the agents might have experienced a
wide range of idiosyncratic shocks. Some agents end up with a high position in asset
holdings from the interaction, but their beliefs are also impacted by their personal
experience when they held less wealth. These asset-wealthy agents react to aggregate
shocks as if they were poorer than they are. The opposite cases could also arise.
Namely, asset-poor agents might respond to aggregate shocks as if they were richer
than they are.
6
Under the shadow price learning with heterogeneous agents in the RBC model,
we found novel interactions between the learning mechanism and the distribution
of individual variables. When the learning rule is simple and only uses aggregate
capital and aggregate shocks as the regressors, the constant learning gain plays an
important role in determining the aggregate variable behaviors. Specifically, asset-
rich agents use data from the periods when they hold low levels of assets and are
more sensitive to aggregate shocks. Their behaviors are close to what it is like when
they are asset-poor. When we allow the agents to have a more complicated learning
rule that includes the individual variables, the agents can learn the “correct” beliefs
that match their asset holdings and idiosyncratic shocks. As a result, the impulse
response functions under the simple learning for the aggregate variables are different
from the rational expectations. The difference disappears when the learning rule is
extended to include the individual variables. We also show that heterogeneity in
agents asset holding is necessary for the adaptive learning introduces the difference
in the impulse response functions. As a counterexample, the representative-agent
version of the model doesn’t exhibit the same properties as the heterogeneous-agent
model with local rationality.
II.2 Literature Review
There has been a wide range of papers that intends to explore the possibility
of explaining business cycle fluctuations with shifts in expectations. Early work by
Benhabib and Farmer (1994, 1996, 2000) and Farmer and Guo (1994, 1995) introduced
the possibility of multiple equilibrium and sunspots into the study of standard
equilibrium business cycles under rational expectations. Eusepi and Preston (2011)
further extended the framework to include learning dynamics that create changes in
expectations and generate business cycles that better match the data’s comovements.
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Another reason to deviate from rational expectations is that the equilibrium solutions
often impose relatively strong assumptions on agents’ knowledge about the economy’s
structure in a model.
This paper belongs to two broad literature work. One intends to reconcile
the predictions of real business cycle theory with observed data. The other is
to investigate the effects of movements in income-and-wealth distribution. The
former includes Hansen (1985), Rogerson (1988), Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992),
Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Andolfatto (1996), Schmitt-Grohe (2000), and Eusepi
and Preston (2011). These papers introduce a range of frictions that range from the
indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibrium to long forecasting horizons for
future prices. The latter literature includes Krusell and Smith (1998), Castaneda et
al. (2003)
II.3 Environment
The following section considers a standard heterogeneous environment in
Aiyagari’s (1993) style, including endogenous labor choice and aggregate shocks
similar to Krusell and Smith (1998). We assume a unit mass of workers who make
choices to maximize their present discounted value of lifetime utility evaluated over







subject to the flow budget constraint and borrowing constraint
cjt + a
j








where cj, lj, aj, and εj denote household j’s consumption, labor choice, asset holding
in the form of capital claims, and individual labor productivity. Êj denotes the
subjective expectation held by household j that might or might not be rational. As is
the standard assumption, different households have different efficiency units of labor
per hour worked. In return to supplying labor, households receive a wage that can
be separated into two components: an aggregate component wt, which is the same
across all workers, and an idiosyncratic component εjt which will be independent and
identically distributed across all workers.
We assume that εjt is a finite-state Markov process with the same transition
matrix for all households Π(εjt , ε
j
t−1). Furthermore, we will assume agents cannot
directly ensure against this idiosyncratic risk but can buy and sell claims to capital
up to an exogenously given borrowing constraint a. The worker’s problem is then to,
taking the stochastic process of rt and wt as given, choose streams of consumption and
labor to maximize (II.1), subject to the borrowing limit ajt+1 ≥ a and time allocation


























where equation (II.3) and (II.4) are euler equation and labor-leisure choice. Equation
(II.5) defines shadow price, λit. The shadow price is the marginal utility of saving from
the last period. The shadow price has a very clear economic meaning that the agents
are aware of instead of just a mathematical number. The euler equation can hold
with inequality only if ajt+1 = 0. Standard methods can show that, given a stochastic
process for rt and wt, an allocation {cjt , l
j
t} solves the household’s problem if and only
if it satisfies (II.2),(II.3), and (II.4). The production technology is standard.
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There is a representative firm which produces output under perfect competition.
The firm rents capital at rental rate rt and hires effective labor from the household
at wage wt, thus the firm solves
max
Kt,Nt
θtf(Kt, Nt)− wtNt − (rt + δ)Kt, (II.6)
where θt is a stochastic variable that affects total factor productivity. The firm chooses
capital and labor inputs, Kt and Nt, to maximize profits, taking factor prices wt and
rt as given. Capital wear-off rate is δ. The optimal condition on behalf of the firm
then yields the first-order conditions
wt = θtfN(Kt, Nt) (II.7)
rt = θtfK(Kt, Nt)− δ, (II.8)
which equate factor prices with their real marginal productions. rt is the rental
rate of capital, and wt is the real wage. The environment introduced here includes
the standard representative-agent growth model or Aiyagari (1994) model, when
idiosyncratic randomness or aggregate randomness is shut down.
II.4 Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE)
In the absence of aggregate uncertainty, agents are assumed to make fully optimal
decisions under idiosyncratic shocks. To account for aggregate shocks, they use an
econometric model as guidance for deviating from the fully optimal decisions. We
leave out the time subscripts for notional convenience and use an apostrophe to
indicate the next period. Naturally, the definition of local rationality consists of
10
two parts: agents’ behavior without aggregate uncertainty and adaptive learning
behaviors under aggregate uncertainty.
II.5 Stationary Recursive Equilibrium
Before introducing our bounded rationality assumptions, we first define the
stationary rational expectations equilibrium absent aggregate shocks by setting θt = 1
for all t. This definition will be used as a benchmark for later comparisons.
Definition 1
A Stationary Recursive Equilibrium consists of a distribution measure µ̄
over (a, ε), policy rules c̄(a, ε), l̄(a, ε),λ̄(a, ε) and ā(a, ε), prices w̄ and r̄,
and aggregate capital and labor supply K̄ and N̄ such that
1. The policy rules c̄(a, ε), l̄(a, ε),λ̄(a, ε) and ā(a, ε) solve recursive
versions of (II.2)-(II.5) for all (a, ε)
c̄(a, ε) + ā(a, ε) = (1 + r̄)a+ w̄εl̄(a, ε)
Ul(c̄(a, ε), l̄(a, ε)) = w̄εUc(c̄(a, ε), l̄(a, ε))
λ̄(a, ε) = (1 + r̄)Uc(c̄(a, ε), l̄(a, ε))




where E is taken over ε′
2. Firm optimally conditions hold w̄ = fN(K̄, N̄) and r̄ = fK(K̄, N̄)−δ.
3. The labor market clears N̄ =
∫
ε(1− l̄(a, ε))dµ̄(a, ε)








Π(ε′, ε)µ̄ ({a : ā(a, ε) ∈ B}, ε) .
II.5.1 Stochastic Recursive Equilibrium - REE
Now consider the rational expectations equilibrium with the aggregate shocks.
The stochastic recursive equilibrium adds aggregate shocks θt to the stationary
version. Agents’ decisions on asset holding, consumption, and labor supply also
depend on prices wt and rt. The prices, in turn, are implied by the market clearing
conditions.
Definition 2
A Stochastic Recursive Equilibrium consists of prices prices wt and rt,
a distribution measure µt as a function of prices over asset holding
and idiosyncratic labor productivity (at, εt), policy rules ct(at, εt;wt, rt),
lt(at, εt;wt, rt), and at+1(at, εt;wt, rt), , and aggregate capital and labor
supply Kt(wt, rt) and Nt(wt, rt) such that
1. The policy rules ct(a, ε), lt(a, ε), and at(a, ε) solve recursive versions
of (II.2)-(II.5) for all (at, εt)
2. Firm optimally conditions hold wt = fN(Kt, Nt) and rt =
fK(Kt, Nt)− δ.
3. The labor market clearsNt(wt, rt) =
∫
εt(1−lt(at, εt;wt, rt))dµ̄(at, εt;wt, rt)
4. The asset market clears Kt(wt, rt) =
∫
atdµt(at, εt;wt, rt)
5. The distribution µt(wt, rt) evolves under the policy rules and the
transition probability Π.
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To compare the results to the bounded rational equilibrium, we define the induced
shadow price from the λt(at, εt;wt, rt) = (1 + rt)Uc(ct(at, εt;wt, rt), lt((at, εt;wt, rt))).
Let I denote a mapping that gives the current information set of the agents, i.e.,
x = I(Ω). We keep this arbitrary for now, but we will allow for specific functions
in future sections1. Let ΛRE be the indeuced ergodic distribution of λt and Xt−1
from the REE. We define ΨRE = E(ΛRE)(xx′)−1E(ΛRE)[x log(λ/λ̄)] where λ̄ is the
stationary steady state from the stationary recursive equilibrium.
II.6 Local Rationality
The difficulty faced in solving a Stochastic Recursive Equilibrium lies in the fact
that policy rules and the law of motion depend on µ, a high dimensional object. The
literature has used multiple approaches to approximate these equilibria. There are
two different approaches. The first type uses projection methods based on Krusell and
Smith (1998) to summarize the distribution with a finite set of moments. The exact
procedure can vary but generally faces the problem that each additional moment
adds an extra dimension to the state space. Thus, the curse of dimensionality quickly
appears. The second approach, first introduced by Reiter (2009), instead linearizes
policy rules around the Stationary Recursive Equilibrium. Our bounded rationality
equilibrium will borrow from both of these works of literature and representative
agent learning literature.
The behavior of rational agents has two interesting limits. The first natural limit
is when the size of the aggregate shocks approaches zero. It’s clear that in the absence
of aggregate shocks, Stationary Recursive Equilibrium is a special case of a Locally
1For example, I could give log deviations of aggregate capital and θ from their stationary recursive
equilibrium values K̄ and θ.
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Rational Recursive Equilibrium. Without the aggregate shocks, the model reduces to
a Bewley/Aiyagari model.
With small aggregate shocks, a locally rational equilibrium’s behavior inherits
properties from the stationary recursive equilibrium, such as the wealth distribution
and level of precautionary savings. This structure allows us to isolate how agents learn
in the presence of aggregate shocks. In the other direction, we can take the limit of
when the size of idiosyncratic shocks εi,t approaches zero and the initial distribution
µ being a point mass with all agents having the same initial wealth and beliefs. In
this limit, the distribution of agents will remain a point mass throughout time, and
we recover behavior similar to the Euler equation learning of Evans and McGough
(2020).
II.6.1 Locally Rational Agents
One hallmark of the rational expectations equilibrium is that agents know the
current distribution of agents and its law of motion and its effect on prices. All of this
is incorporated into the agents’ decision-making process through the expectation term.
This section embraces the bounded rationality assumption and instead assumes agents
don’t have access to the entire state variable’s distribution. They form expectations
by learning from their experience. A novel aspect of our approach is that we assume
agents know how to behave optimally in the absence of aggregate risk and only learn
how aggregate shocks should affect their decisions.
In doing so, we adjust the decision problem of the agent as follows. Agents’
information set is x, and a vector summarizing their beliefs, ψ. They use their
information and beliefs ψ from expectations over the future marginal value of savings,
which we denote by Eψ[λ′]. Given current prices, r and w, we posit that the agent’s
14
decisions rules then solve the following equation system.
c(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w) + a′(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w) = (1 + r)a+ wεl(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w) (II.9)
Ul(c(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w), l(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w) = wεUc(c(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w), l(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w)) (II.10)
λ(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w) = (1 + r)Uc(c(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w), l(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w)) (II.11)
Uc(c(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w), l(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w)) ≥ βEψ
[
λ′|a′(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w), ε, x
]
(II.12)
with equality only if a(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w) = a. Note that equations (II.9)-(II.12)
are behavorial primitives : they are imposed assumptions on the behavior the the
households. In order to determine an agent’s choices, we need to specify how the
expectation Eψ [λ′|a, ε, x] is formed. Our local rationality assumption is that agents
form expectations relative to how they would rationally behave in the the stationary
recursive equilibrium. Specifically we assume Eψ [λ′|a(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w), ε′, x] =
λ̄(a′(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w), ε′) exp(ψ′x). Taking expectations over ε′ we then recover
Eψ
[





Π(ε, ε′)λ̄(a′(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w), ε′)
)
exp(ψ′x). (II.13)
Consistent with the forecasting rule, we assume that households update ψ by
regressing log deviations of λ(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w) from λ̄(a, ε) on the previous periods
information set x . Beliefs are then updated each period via a recursive constant
gain learning rule as follows. We let R represent the previous period’s estimate for
the covariance matrix of x. The covariance matrix of x is updated via
R(x ,R ) = R + γ(x ′x −R ). (II.14)
While beliefs ψ are updated according to











The current state of the economy is Ω = (µ, θ, x , R ) where µ is the joint distribution
over (a, ε, ψ). We are now able to define locally rational recursive dynamics.
Definition 3
A locally rational recursive dynamics consists of policy rules c(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w),
l(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w), a′(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w),and λ(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w); evolution of beliefs
R(x ,R ) and ψ′(a, ε;x, x , ψ, r, w); pricing functions r(Ω) and w(Ω);
aggregate firm choices N(Ω) and K(Ω); a function specifying the
information set x = I(Ω); and a law of motion for the aggregate
distribution H(Ω) such that
1. Given prices r and w, c(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w), n(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w), a′(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w),
and λ(a, ε;x, ψ, r, w) solve (II.9)-(II.13)
2. Firms behave optimally: w(Ω) = θ(Ω)fN(K(Ω), N(Ω)) and r(Ω) =
θ(Ω)fK(K(Ω), N(Ω))− δ.
3. The labor market clearsN(Ω) =
∫
ε(1−l(a, ε;x, ψ, r(Ω), w(Ω)))dµ(a, ε, ψ)
4. The asset market clears K(µ, θ) =
∫
adµ(a, ε, ψ)
5. Beliefs evolve according to constant gain learning: R(x ,R ) and
ψ′(a, ε;x, x , ψ, r, w) satisfy (II.14) and (II.15)
6. The law of motion H is consistent with a′(a, ε;x, ψ, r(Ω), w(Ω)),
Π,ψ′(a, ε;x, x , ψ, r(Ω), w(Ω)), I(Ω), and R(x ,R ).
II.6.2 Restricted Perception Equilibrium - LREE
We are ready to define the locally rational expectations equilibrium as a restricted
perceptions equilibrium based on the definition of locally rational recursive dynamics.
The folk theorem of the learning literature states that the long-run beliefs will
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converge to a restricted perceptions equilibrium (RPE) if the equilibrium is E-
stable. Intuitively, RPE is characterized by self-confirming beliefs. Hold beliefs
fixed at ψt = ψ̄ for all t and all agents. Feed these fixed beliefs ψt into the locally
rational recursive dynamics without the belief evolving part in the fifth bullet point.
Let Λ(ψ̄) be the induced ergodic distribution of the shadow price and information
set (λt+1 and Xt) from the dynamics. We can construct the linear projection
of log(λ/λ̄) on X under measure Λ(ψ̄). Effectively, the locally rational recursive
dynamics defines a T-map for the agents beliefs with the form ψ̄′ = T (ψ̄). Here
T (ψ̄) = EΛ(ψ̄)[XX ′]−1EΛ(ψ̄)[X log(λ/λ̄)] and defines the the coefficients of the learning
model from the ergodic distribution of the dynamics. We have the following definition
Definition 4
A locally rational expectations equilibrium is a locally rational recursive
dynamics with the ergodic distributions of the beliefs ψ∗ such that ψ∗ =
EΛ(ψ∗)[XX ′]−1EΛ(ψ∗)[X log(λ/λ̄)].
This framework approximately nests the rational expectations equilibrium. Let ΛRE
be the induced ergodic distribution of λt and Xt−1 from the rational expectations
equilibrium.
II.7 Calibration and Simulation





the production function takes the standard Cobb-Douglas form. f(K,N) = KαN1−α.
The calibration of the model is done through moment matching in the stationary
stochastic equilibrium (SSE) without the aggregate shocks. There are three sets
of parameters that need to be set: (i) parameters related to household preferences,
productions, and aggregate shocks; (ii) initial conditions; and (iii) stochastic processes
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for idiosyncratic shocks. The details of calibrations are summarized in Table (1). I
explain the parameters in the following three subsections.
Variable Moment RA HA
σ CES parameter 2.0000 2.0000
γ Frisch elasticity 2.0000 2.0000
β Capital-Output Ratio 0.9612 0.9277
χ Leisure Ratio = 0.33 55.206 54.738
a Borrowing constraint 0.0000 0.0000
α 65% output → labor 0.3500 0.3500
ρθ Krueger et al. (2009) 0.8150 0.8150
σθ Krueger et al. (2009) 0.0140 0.0140
ρzp Permanent ρ - 0.9923
σzp Permanent idio. - 0.1960
σzt I.I.D idio. - 0.2300
TABLE 1 Benchmark Yearly Calibrations
II.7.1 Preferences, Productions and Aggregate Shocks
The settings of parameters match standard representative agent calibrations such
as Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Siu (2004). I set the CES parameters for
household consumption and labor at σ = 2, γ = 2, and the discount factor β is set so
that the aggregate capital to GDP ratio is 10.26 for the yearly calibration. The firms
operate a decreasing return to scale technology so that the labor income accounts for
65% of the total output. We calibrate χ to target 1 − l̄ to be 0.333 in the steady
state, which implies spending approximately 33.3% of their time allocation working.















Agents respond to the log deviation of capital and productivity from their steady-state
values. Finally, agents cannot borrow which means a = 0.
II.7.2 Initial Conditions and Learning
For the representative agent model, the initial conditions for each variable are
at the steady-state level. For the heterogeneous agent model, the initial conditions
are drawn from the stationary distribution of the stationary recursive equilibrium. In
addition to the standard calibrations, our simulations also require specifying initial
conditions, including the joint distribution (µ) of assets, productivity, and beliefs.
Also, the covariance matrix R needs initialization. The joint distribution of assets
and productivity are taken to be the joint distribution of assets and productivity
from the stationary recursive equilibrium,µ̄. The initial covariance matrix R0, which
is shared across all agents, is derived from data generated by the rational expectations
equilibrium.
II.7.3 Stochastic Processes
I calibrate the aggregate productivity process following Krueger, who estimated
a process for disposable earnings after taxes and transfers. They estimated an
annual persistence of innovations to be ρθ = 0.815 with a standard deviation of
σθ = 0.014. We assume the idiosyncratic log productivity process is the sum of an
AR(1) and i.i.d. component. The calibration follows the practices in Krueger (2005),
who estimated a process for disposable earnings after taxes and transfers. They
estimated an annual persistence of innovations to be 0.992 with a standard deviation
of 0.098. The standard deviation of the transitory component they estimated to be
0.23. The combination of the permanent shocks and transitory shocks can help the
model account for the wealth and income inequality of the model. The idiosyncratic
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productivity process is approximated using the Rouwenhorst method with 7 grid
points for the permanent component and 3 grid points for the transitory component.
II.7.4 Numeric Method
To compute the stationary recursive equilibrium, we approximate the agents’
income process using a finite-state Markov chain. We discretize the AR(1) component
of productivity with seven grid points using Rouwenhorst’s method in Kopecky and
Suen (2010) and the transitory component with three grid points Gauss-Hermite
quadrature. The agent’s decision rules are approximated along the asset dimension
with 100 grid points, non-linearly spaced. We solve for the agents’ optimal decision
rules conditional on prices via the endogenous grid method of Caroll. The stationary
distribution is solved by approximating the distribution with a histogram of 10, 00
data points. We construct a transition matrix with the approximated policy rules and
then solve the transition matrix’s stationary distribution. Finally, β and χ are chosen
to target the capital-to-output ratio and aggregate labor supply through a non-linear
solver. To approximate the Recursive Competitive Equilibrium, we follow Boppart
et al. (2018) to linearize policy rules around the Stationary Recursive Equilibrium
by constructing impulse response functions. Details, as well as our tests verifying
the linearity assumption, are provided in Appendix A. We apply algorithm 1 to
simulate the locally rational equilibrium conditional on initial beliefs. The simulation
requires solving the temporary equilibrium each period conditional on the distribution
of beliefs and aggregate states. We apply a variant of the endogenous grid method to
approximate each agents’ policies conditional on prices quickly.
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II.7.5 Calibrated Distributions and Policy Rules
Figure (1) shows the asset distribution and the policies rules for the asset holding,
consumption, and labor supply from the stationary stochastic equilibrium. In general,
most agents hold an asset level less than 5, and there is a mass probability for agents
to be on the borrowing constraint. The different colors in figure (1b)-(1d) stand
for varying levels of idiosyncratic income shocks. In general, when the idiosyncratic
income shock is higher for an agent, they tend to consume more and also have a
higher asset holding for the future period. From the policies functions, we can see
that the asset holding policy function varies very little across different income shock
levels, whereas the income shocks have a relatively large impact on the consumption
levels for the agents. The labor supply function is a little different from the other
two policy functions in the sense that agents behave differently with a high or a low
asset holding. Given a low productivity shock, an agent would work more when they
are asset-poor and work less when they are asset-rich. This behavior change is shown
through the crossovers of the line plot in figure(1d).
II.7.6 Simulation Algorithm
A fairly simple algorithm can be constructed to simulate the dynamics with
locally rational agents., shown as follows. Given the parameters set by the calibration
set by the previous section, we can first solve for the stationary distribution for
the shadow price λ̄(a, ε), the algorithm basically finds the fixed point of prices
and distributions that satisfies the inter-temporal conditions. There are several
features of this algorithm to consider. The simulation without aggregate risk only
requires solving a single Bellman equation to determine the shadow price λ̄(a, ε).
This compares favorably to Giusto (2014), which requires repeatedly solving the
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(a) Wealth Distribution (b) Asset Holding Policy
(c) Consumption Policy












FIGURE 1. Stationary Stochastic Equilibrium
Note: The first graph shows that the wealth distribution from the stationary
equilibrium is heavily skewed. Most of the wealth is held by a small number of
rich agents. The rest of the three figures show the policy functions for an agent in the
stationary equilibrium. These policy functions are the optimal choices in the absence
of aggregate risks.
Bellman equation after each period, and value functions, which take aggregate and
idiosyncratic states as function inputs. The most computationally intensive part of
this process is step 4 which requires solving a non-linear equation in r , w, and
{a′i, li, ci, λi}. Intuitively, this can be achieved by determining the choices for each
agent that solve (II.9)-(II.12) for a given (r, w). The process speeds up by noting
that differences in individual agents’ decisions depend only on ηi exp(ψ
′
ix); thus, it is
possible to pre-compute those decisions, further speeding up the algorithms.
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Intialize: For current parameterization solve for steady state λ̄(a, ε). Let Ω
be the current aggregate state, assume the µ ∈ Ωt is populated by a finite
number M of agents indexed by i for t ∈ 1 to T do
Compute x = I(Ωt) Find for r, w and {a′i, li, ci, λi} such the policies
a′i, li, ci, λi solve equations (II.9)-(II.12) for each ai, ψi, εi ∈ µ(Ωt) and













r = θ(Ωt)fK(N,K)− δ
w = θ(Ωt)fN(N,K)
hold Update beliefs ψ′i and R according to (II.14) and (II.15) Draw new
aggregate shock θ′ Draw new productivity ε′i for each agent i and
construct µ′ from {a′i, ε′i, ψ′i} Update Ωt+1 = (µ′, θ′, x, R)
end
Algorithm 1: Simulation of Economy Locally Rational Agents
II.8 Model Results
This section presents the computational results from the models and equilibrium
concepts. We first show that the restricted perception equilibrium exists by simulation
and then draw the connection between the RPE beliefs and REE beliefs. We also
compare the impulse response functions (IRF) from RPE and REE and show that
learning gain can play a role in how the aggregate variables respond to the shocks.
We provide detailed explanations for the IRFs and argue that the results are coming
from the interactions of learning mechanisms and the heterogeneity across the agents.
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II.8.1 Existence of RPE
By simulations, we show that the locally rational expectations equilibrium exists.
We use the calibration from the previous section and set the constant learning gain
to be 0.005, which is a relatively small gain. For the benchmark model, we let the
information mapping function to be
xt = I(Ωt) = (1, log(Kt/K̄), log(θt))
where K̄ is the steady state of aggregate capital from the stationary recursive
equilibrium. For the benchmark model, the learning gain is 0.01. To compute the
locally rational expectations equilibrium, we follow the definition and execute the
following two steps. First, we simulate the locally rational expectations dynamics
with initial beliefs (0, 0, 0) for ψi0 for all agents. The simulation runs for 100, 000
agents for 30, 000 periods of time. We take the average belief over all agents from the
last 50, 000 periods as the potential candidate for the restricted perception equilibrium
(RPE) beliefs. To check that this average belief is indeed from the RPE, we fix the
beliefs at this average level and simulate the locally rational expectations dynamics
again for 10, 000 periods2 with 100, 000 agents. The induced belief distribution is
given in Figure (2). The vertical red lines in Figure (2) represent the average beliefs
(loading on the constant term, aggregate capital, and aggregate shock) computed
from the last 5, 000 of the initial 30, 000 periods of simulation. The histogram shows
the ergodic distribution of the induced beliefs from the simulation holding the beliefs
2We have simulated the model for more than 1 million periods with various different calibrations,
the per-period temporary equilibrium can always be solved. Eventually, the temporary equilibrium
can be represented by the function that is a mapping from aggregate labor supply to itself. This
mapping always crosses the 45 degree line and hence has a solution.
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FIGURE 2. Induced Belief Distribution
Note: The blue histograms are the induced belief distributions for the three estimates
of the learning rule. They correspond to the belief loading on the constant, aggregate
capital, and aggregate income shock. The red vertical line shows where the initial
beliefs are located.
fixed at the red line level. The simulation shows that the RPE beliefs fall into the
distribution of the ergodic beliefs distribution and hence are self-referential.
II.8.2 Learnability of REE
There are two well-documented features of this economy that allow this forecast
to be simplified further. First, the economy is well approximated linear policy
rules around the stationary recursive equilibrium. Second, approximate aggregation
holds in general. We first define the estimates for the forecasting rule under
rational expectations where agents have full knowledge of how their expected
future marginal value of savings E [λ(a′, ε′, H(µ, θ), θ′)|a′, ε′, µ, θ] Given a rational
expectations equilibrium, it is then possible to construct functions ψRE(a, ε) such that
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ψRE(a, e) = cov(x, x|a, ε)−1cov(x, log(λ/λ̄)|a, ε). The REE beliefs are the aggregate
beliefs over the distribution of agent’s asset holding and individual income shocks.
The computational results for REE beliefs are represented by the blue dashed line
in Figure (3) We show that not only do the RPE beliefs exist but also that they
FIGURE 3. RPE and REE Beliefs
Note: The three graphs correspond to the time paths of the belief loading on the
constant, aggregate capital, and aggregate income shock. They show that the average
RPE beliefs converge to the rational expectations equilibrium beliefs for each belief
loading.
are similar to the rational expectations equilibrium beliefs. Figure (3) shows the
learning dynamics from the LREE compared to the REE counterpart. The three
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subplots in the figure represent each estimate for the coefficient in the learning rule.
In this case, the belief components are for the constant term, aggregate capital
deviation, and aggregate income shock deviation. These results computationally show
that the aggregate rational expectations equilibrium beliefs in a heterogeneous-agent
environment could be learned by the agents if they are locally rational. However, the
convergence of aggregate beliefs to the REE levels does not imply the models behave
identically under the RPE and REE. Details are presented in the next section.
II.8.3 Impulse Response Functions
To compute the impulse response functions (IRFs) from the locally rational
expectations equilibrium, we draw distributions of the asset holdings, individual
shocks, and beliefs from the ergodic distribution of the restricted perception
equilibrium. Give the model a negative aggregate income shock and compute the
impulse responses of the aggregate variables. We repeat the process 500 times and
use the median time paths of the aggregate variables as the IRFs. We also compute
the top 2.5 percentile and bottom 2.5 percentile as a proxy of the 95 percentile of
the IRFs. Figure (4) displays the corresponding impulse responses of changes in
the aggregate asset and aggregate consumption implied by one standard deviation of
exogenous innovation of aggregate income shock εθ.
Figure (4) shows when the learning gain is 0.001, which is set to be relatively
low, there is a clear difference between the impulse responses in the LREE and
REE. Specifically, aggregate capital stock falls less than their rational expectations
counterparts, with aggregate capital falling 25% less in response to a one-standard-
deviation fall in productivity. Meanwhile, consumption falls by more than the rational
expectations counterpart. However, this discrepancy disappears when the learning
gain is relatively high. The average path of all three variables lies almost exactly in
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(a) Aggregate Capital (b) Aggregate Consumption
(c) Interest Rate (d) Aggregate Output
FIGURE 4. Impulse Response Functions with Learning Gain of 0.001
Note:This figure is simulated with a heterogeneous-agent model. The impulse
response functions from the LREE (black dashed lines) with low learning gain
compared to REE (red dashed lines). The LREE cuts consumption more than the
REE counterpart under a negative productivity shock. The three black dash-lines are
97.5%, 50%, and 0.5% responses from the ergodic distributions of the LREE.
line with the rational expectations impulse response functions. Figure (5) shows the
IRFs from LREE with a learning gain of 0.1.
Higher gain implies that agents place greater weight on more recent experiences
when forecasting future values, which means a higher variance of beliefs in the
ergodic distribution. The intuition for the difference is that under lower gain, agents
essentially use the long periods of time3 to estimate the forecasting model. Meanwhile,
a large proportion of the asset is held by rich agents in the economy because the wealth
3If γgain be the learning gain, agents use
1
γgain
to estimate the forecasting rule.
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(a) Aggregate Capital (b) Aggregate Consumption
(c) Interest Rate (d) Aggregate Output
FIGURE 5. Impulse Response Functions with Learning Gain of 0.1
Note:This figure is simulated with a heterogeneous-agent model. The impulse
response functions from the LREE (black dashed lines) with high learning gain
compared to REE (red dashed lines). The aggregate responses are comparable.
The three black dash-lines are 97.5%, 50%, and 0.5% responses from the ergodic
distributions of the LREE.
distribution is heavily skewed according to Figure (7a). As a result, these rich agents
who are currently holding a high level of assets also used their historical data from
when they were poor. In some way, these agents behave more like the asset-poor
type than the asset-rich type in the rational expectations equilibrium. Whereas with
a high learning gain, the agents can quickly adjust to the beliefs commensurate to
their asset-holding level.
To understand why the IRFs from the LREE are different in the specific direction
compared to the REE, we need to dive into how agents’ asset holding affects their
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beliefs. Specifically, in a low gain setting, the agents who are currently poor but
who also still have beliefs consistent with being rich behave in a manner that is
consistent with some notion of decreased risk aversion. We first need to understand
the implication of having low and high beliefs in the environment we have set up. We
show in Figure (6) how beliefs are associated with asset holding levels in a rational
expectations equilibrium. The blue line represents how the belief loading on capital
in the learning rule in the REE model for the agents who have the lowest idiosyncratic
(s = 1) shock, whereas the golden line to the right stands for the case when the agents
have the highest idiosyncratic shock (s = 21).
FIGURE 6. Belief Loading on Aggregate Capital in REE
Note: Each “s” stands for an individual productivity shock level. The figure shows
the loading on aggregate capital from a rational expectations equilibrium. It shows
that the REE beliefs should be a function of both idiosyncratic shocks and individual
asset holding. The functional form might be highly nonlinear as s = 21 shows.
We see that, in general, there is a positive association of loading on the aggregate
capital in the learning rule to the asset level. The loading on the aggregate capital
shows how the agents believe a negative aggregate shock affects their future marginal
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utility from consumption. When the loading on capital becomes higher, the agent
thinks a negative aggregate shock will have a smaller impact on their future, and
hence they would cut their consumption less today. The extreme case is that when
the agents are very wealthy, and the loading on capital becomes positive, they would
increase their consumption today under a negative aggregate income shock. There
will be more labor supply under a negative aggregate shock, and hence the marginal
return for capital increases according to the Cobb-Douglas production function. In
this situation, for an asset-rich agent, the increase in the capital returns cancels out.
It even outweighs the negative impact of a lower labor income from the negative
aggregate shock. As a result, the very wealthy agents with a positive loading on the
capital increase consumption when there is a negative productivity shock.
If the learning gain is low, the asset-rich agents use a long period of historical
data to estimate the beliefs for the learning rule. As a result, their beliefs on
aggregate capital are underestimated. Consequently, the association of belief loading
on aggregate capital to the asset level will become less strong in a low gain setting.
Figure (7) shows the scatter plot of a large number of agents drawn from the ergodic
distribution with locally rational expectations. We can see that the association
between asset and belief is much weaker under the low gain setting than under the
high-gain setting. An important takeaway here is that the simple learning rule that
only uses aggregate capital and aggregate shock as the regressors omit two variables
important to forecasting the shadow price: idiosyncratic shocks and individual asset
holding. We will extend the learning rule to include these two variables in later
sections to show the corresponding results.
Now we can analyze impulse response functions in Figure (4) and Figure (5)
are different from each other. Specifically, with a low learning gain as in Figure (4),
rich agents use extended historical data to forecast their future shadow price and
remember what it was like to have a low level of asset holding from the past. As a
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result, these agents underestimate the belief loading on the aggregate capital. Facing
an aggregate shock, these rich agents tend to cut their consumption more than what
the REE would justify. As a result, we see that consumption has a more considerable
fall in Figure (4b) than the impulse responses under REE. Simultaneously, these rich
agents with underestimated beliefs also tend to save more than the REE would justify,
which is shown in Figure (4a).
(a) Learning Gain = 0.1 (b) Learning Gain = 0.001
FIGURE 7. Belief Estimates on Aggregate Capital
Note: The scatter plots of asset holding and belief loading on aggregate capital. The
left panel is simulated with a high learning gain, whereas the right panel is simulated
with a small learning gain. The high learning gain presents a positive association of
asset holding and belief loading.
This observation shows that locally rational agents have a certain level of habit
persistence behaviors. However, this habit persistence only exists in a heterogeneous-
agent model. Recall that the idiosyncratic income shocks introduce heterogeneity to
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the population. Consequently, the asset holdings can present a distribution over a
wide range. Intuitively, the agents who currently enjoy high-income levels might have
gone through a low-income phase and vise versa. Whereas in the representative-agent
model, all agents always have the same levels of income. The variation in income only
comes from the aggregate shocks, which only cause the wealth to fluctuate slightly
away from the steady-state level. As a result, the representative agents can learn the
corresponding beliefs of the rational expectations equilibrium over time because they
are never too far away from the steady-state wealth level. To illustrate the insight,
we simulate the impulse response functions from the LREE with the same level of
low learning gain. It shows that the LREE impulse responses match the REE ones.
FIGURE 8. IRFs from Representative Agent
Note:This figure is simulated with a representative-agent model. The impulse
response functions from the LREE (black dashed lines) with low learning gain
compared to REE (red dashed lines). The three black dash-lines are 97.5%, 50%,
and 0.5% responses from the ergodic distributions of the LREE.
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II.8.4 Extended Forecasting Function
We can also endow agents with a more complicated forecasting rule. To do this,



















Now when learning and forecasting their future marginal utility of saving,
agents take into account how their individual states (asset holding and idiosyncratic
shocks) interact with aggregate variables. Specifically, this extended learning rule
can approximate the relationship between the belief loadings and individual state
variables represented in Figure (6).
This extended forecasting rule captures the monotonic dependence of the beliefs
of the agents on individual states. Comparing impulse responses in Figure (9) to
Figure (4), we see that including just a set of interaction terms generates impulse
response that almost precisely line up with those of the rational expectations
equilibrium. This simulation from the extended learning rule justifies using REE
in a heterogeneous-agent environment. The agents do not necessarily need to know
the whole distribution of the state variable and the economy’s structure to make
optimal decisions. Figure (9) shows that when individual variables are introduced in
the learning rule, the agents can effectively learn the positive associations between
the belief estimates and the asset. Agents can still learn the correct beliefs quickly
even when the constant learning gain is as low as 0.001.
An interesting observation is that the borrowing constraint plays a very small
role in the LREE results here. It is true that when the borrowing constraint is
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(c) Aggregate Labor Hours








FIGURE 9. IRFs from Expanded Learning Rule with Gain of 0.001
Note:This figure is simulated with a heterogeneous-agent model. The learning rule
includes both aggregate variable and individual variables. The impulse response
functions from the LREE (black dashed lines) with low learning gain compared
to REE (red dashed lines). The three black dash-lines are 97.5%, 50%, and 0.5%
responses from the ergodic distributions of the LREE.
relaxed, there will be fewer agents who are on the constraint. However, the main
result is driven by the rich agents who underestimate their belief loadings due to
a low learning gain. This is very different from most heterogeneous-agent papers
that find that the model behaves differently due to the borrowing constraint. In the




This chapter extends the analysis of adaptive learning and shadow-price learning
to a heterogeneous-agent environment. A novel concept of local rationality is
introduced. Local rationality assumes that agents can make fully optimal decisions
under idiosyncratic shocks in the absence of aggregate uncertainty. However, agents
do not know the equilibrium mapping from the economy’s aggregate states to the
distribution of state variables and market-clearing prices. We found novel interactions
between the learning mechanism and the distribution of individual variables under
adaptive learning in the heterogeneous-agent model. Suppose the agents use a
simple learning rule that contains only the aggregate variables. In that case, the
locally rational agents can behave differently from the rational agents because they
can’t adjust quickly to the beliefs that correspond to their asset level. The two
exceptions are when the learning gain is high and the learning rule is extended to
include the individual variables. This chapter contributes to two works of literature.
First, the LREE environment can be used as an efficient computational method
for approximating the impulse response functions under rational expectations. To
achieve this approximation, the modeler needs to include idiosyncratic variables in
the learning rule. This finding also justifies using rational expectations in the recent
development of heterogeneous-agent models where most results are drawn from the
REE assumption. Although the assumption is based on the agents’ understanding
of the vastly complicated model and its dynamics, they can learn it with relatively
simple information such as aggregate shocks and individual shocks. In addition to
the computational contribution, future modelers could also investigate the behavioral
aspect of shadow-price learning. Future work could be done in re-examining how the
heterogeneous agent New Keynesian (HANK) model would still hold the results when







This chapter is a natural extension of the previous one. Here, I introduce local
rationality to a New Keynesian (LRHANK) economy with incomplete markets and
sticky nominal prices. Households are heterogeneous and face idiosyncratic wage risks.
Both aggregate productivity shocks and monetary policy shocks are incorporated into
the model. Both households and intermediate-good producers are assumed to be
locally rational because they make optimal state-contingent decisions in the absence
of aggregate uncertainties. Agents use estimated econometric models to forecast
their shadow prices to accommodate aggregate uncertainties. For simplicity, the
model is set to have a zero-inflation trend. In a calibrated model that captures
income inequality, I implement a monetary experiment to see how monetary policy
plays a role in household wealth inequality. I show that the aggregate responses to
policies differ from their counterparts in a similar model with entirely rational agents,
which further confirms that adaptive learning introduces behavior implications in
heterogeneous-agent models.
I explore the implication of local rationality introduced in the previous chapter
to a Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) model. As a more realistic model
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than the representative-agent counterpart, the HANK model can be used to match
the distributions of wealth and marginal propensities to consume. New results have
been found through the lens of the HANK model. Kaplan et al. (2018) find that the
indirect effects of an unexpected decrease in interest rates operating through a general
equilibrium increase in labor demand outweigh the direct effects of inter-temporal
substitution. McKay et al. (2016) find the power of forward guidance smaller in a
HANK model than in the standard model. Bhandari et al. find that the Ramsey
planner’s optimal policy responses differ from the representative agent economy in
magnitudes and directions. However, all of the results are drawn from a rational
expectation equilibrium. REE imposes strong assumptions on agents’ knowledge
about the economic structure and the law of motions of some large-dimension states.
In this paper, agents are instead assumed to be locally rational and make optimal
state-contingent decisions in the absence of aggregate monetary policy uncertainty.
To accommodate aggregate uncertainties, these agents use estimated econometric
models to extend their rational shadow-price forecasts. The local rationality concept
is identical to the previous chapter. The only difference here is the environment that
includes price-stickiness.
In a calibrated model, I show that the aggregate responses to policies in a
restricted perception equilibrium differ from their counterparts in a similar model with
rational agents. Specifically, I show that wealth inequality’s response to a monetary
shock or a productivity shock differs in an LRHANK model than a HANK model.
In a HANK model with rational expectations, the wealth distribution does not react
much to aggregate shocks. In contrast, we get a lot of movements in the wealth
inequality from the LRHANK model. I further show that the movement in the wealth
distribution under LRHANK is mainly coming from the top wealthy agents.
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III.2 Literature Review
Although the traditional monetary policy tools are not well-suited to achieve
distributional goals, it is still important for policymakers to understand and monitor
the effects on different groups within society. In general, monetary policy affects
inequality, and rising inequality affects the effectiveness of the policies. There is a wide
range of papers that connect monetary policy to inequality. The related literature
is trying to understand the connection from the empirical perspective. Cobian et
al. (2017) studied the effects of monetary policy shocks on consumption and income
inequality in the United States using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
They found that monetary policy shocks account for a non-trivial component of the
historical variations in inequality. Specifically, a contractionary monetary policy shock
systematically increases inequality. Other research by Ostry et al. (2019) over recent
decades supports these findings. Their study finds that an unanticipated 100 basis-
point decline in the interest rate lowers the Gini measure of inequality by 1.25 percent
in the short term and by 2.25 in the medium term. These results are in line with the
general finding that contractionary monetary policy makes wealth inequality worse.
Amaral (2017) discussed a wide range of channels that monetary policy might have
a distributional effect but commented that the link between monetary policy and
inequality is still inconclusive. A small body of works exists to establish the connection
between monetary policy and income/wealth inequality by reviewing the theoretical
channels. Dolado et al. (2018) focus exclusively on the earnings heterogeneity channel
through the asymmetric nature of searching-and-matching frictions.
However, all of the theoretical models are drawn from the assumption of rational
expectations equilibrium. This paper serves as the first one to understand how
adaptive learning can introduce the distributional effects from the aggregate shocks.
I found that a contractionary monetary policy can exacerbate wealth inequality when
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the agents are locally rational with a simple learning rule that only includes aggregate
variables and a relatively low learning gain. This distributional effect disappears
when the agents are entirely rational, which matches the results from Amaral (2017).
The productivity shock also produces movement in the wealth distribution, but the
direction is more mixed than a monetary shock. I further present the computational
results that the top-wealthy agents primarily drive the distributional effects from the
monetary and productivity shocks. In this learning environment, these top-wealthy
agents behave more like an asset-poor type in their rational expectations counterpart.
III.3 Baseline HANK Model
I consider a benchmark new Keynesian economy with heterogeneous agents,
incomplete markets, and nominal rigidities. There are four sectors: households, final-
good producers, intermediate-good producers, and the government. Price stickiness
is introduced in the style of Rotemberg (1982). The model is purposefully set to be a
simple one to give insight into what local rationality brings in a HANK environment.
Both aggregate productivity shocks and aggregate monetary shocks are considered.
III.3.1 Households
A unit mass of households makes choices to maximize their present discounted
value of lifetime utility evaluated over stochastic streams of the final consumption














where σ, χ, γ > 0. Household ω supplies zt(ω)nt(ω) units of labor at time t in
the labor market in return of common wage wt per unit of labor. Here zt(ω) is an
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idiosyncratic productivity shock that affects household ω. Households trade one-
period riskless bonds bt at time t up to a borrowing constraint b with each other and
with the government. The real price of one unit of the riskless bond is normalized to
1. The bond purchased at time t has a nominal rate return of 1 + it at time t+ 1. Let
Πt be the inflation rate at time t and dt(ω) be the dividend received by household ω
from the intermediate-good producers measured in units of the final good. Finally,
the government takes a lump-sum tax Tt from the household in each period. The
household’s problem is to, taking idiosyncratic productivity shock zt(ω), lump-sum
tax Tt, dividend dt(ω), inflation rate Πt,wage wt, the nominal interest rate it and
initial bond holding b−1, as given, choose streams of the final good {ct(ω)}, labor
supply {nt(ω)}, and bond holdings {bt(ω)} to maximize (III.1) subject to a period
budget constraint and a borrowing constraint





bt−1(ω) + dt(ω)− Tt (III.2)
bt(ω) > b (III.3)
Household ω’s utility maximization problem yields the following first-order
conditions







nχt (ω) = c
−σ
t (ω)zt(ω)wt (III.6)
where Eq.(III.4)-(III.5) are the intertemporal Euler equation and Eq.(III.6) is the
standard intra-temporal labor leisure trade-off equation. It will show that it is
convenient to write the Euler equation into (III.4)-(III.5) for the introduction of local
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III.3.2 Final Good Producers
A final good Yt is produced by competitive firms that use a continuum of










with ν > 1 denoting the elasticity of substitution of different intermediate goods
used in the production function. The final-good producer solves the following profit

























The shadow price of producing one extra unit of final good implies the nominal









III.3.3 Intermediate Good Producers
There is a unit mass of intermediate-good producers. Intermediate goods are
produced by these firms and sold in monopolistically competitive markets. Firm ω




where θt is an economy-wise aggregate productivity shock that hits every intermediate
firm, and `t(ω) is the amount of effective labor hired by firm ω. The logarithm of θt
follows an AR(1) process as follows
log(θt) = ρθ log(θt−1) + ξ
θ
t (III.13)
ξθt ∼ Normal(0, σ2θ) (III.14)
Cost minimization implies that the intermediate good producer ω’s marginal cost










These monopolistic firms face downward-sloping demand curves specified by
Eq.(III.10) and choose prices pt(ω) while bearing quadratic Rotemberg (1982) price
adjustment costs measured in units of the final consumption good written as follows.
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Firm ω chooses prices {pt(ω)} to maximize profit, taking aggregate consumption
{Ct}, aggregate final goods production {Yt}, aggregate price {Pt}, wage {wt},
aggregate productivity shock {θt} as given. Each firm is assumed to value
profit streams with a stochastic discount factor driven by aggregate consumption.
Intermediate firm ω’s profit maximization problem is given as follows. The derivation






















Assume all of the intermediate firms fully believe that the economy is in a symmetric
equilibrium. The first-order condition for intermediate firms’ price-setting problem
can be written as follows. The derivation is provided in Appendix I.1.
C−σt
(














t Πt(1 + Πt) (III.19)
where Λt is the shadow price for the intermediate-good producers. This shadow price
is not just a numeric number but has an economic meaning. Specifically, the shadow
price is the marginal revenue for the firm if they increase the price by one unit in the
next period. The optimality condition states that the firm will choose a price such that
the marginal cost is equal to the marginal revenue. For simplicity, we assume the firms
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know the aggregate consumption when they make choices about the current price.
Eq.(III.18)-(III.19) state that if the intermediate producers expect higher inflation
from t to t+ 1, they will choose higher Pt to smooth the price adjustment cost. This
smoothing behavior comes from the adjustment cost being a quadratic function in
the price change. Finally, the dividends from the intermediate firm are uniformly
distributed across the households so that.




There are important implications for different dividends schedules. For the benchmark
model, I only consider the simple uniform dividend schedule for now.
III.3.4 Government
According to a Taylor rule, the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate
on bonds it up to an aggregate policy shock.
it = i+ φΠΠt + εt (III.21)
where i is the nominal interest rate target, and φ is the feedback parameter for
inflation. Note that in this benchmark model, the inflation target is 0. εt is the
aggregate policy shock that follows a stochastic process and follows an AR(1) process
as follows
εt = ρεεt−1 + ξ
ε
t (III.22)
ξεt ∼ Normal(0, σ2ε) (III.23)
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The government borrows by selling bonds Bt to the households, and the outstanding




Bt−1 = Bt + Tt (III.24)
Assume that the total bond supply or government debt Bt is constant and equals B̄
in each period, and the government chooses Tt to balance the budget constraint.
III.3.5 Market Clearing Conditions
In a symmetric equilibrium, pt(ω) = Pt, yt(ω) = Yt for all ω ∈ [0, 1]. Also the
labor demand from each intermediate firm is the same and equals to the aggregate














where Eq.(III.25), Eq.(III.26), and Eq.(III.27) are the market clearing conditions for




This subsection introduces the equilibria of the model with representative agents.
I define the rational expectations equilibrium and the bounded rational equilibrium
here.
Definition 5
Given an initial condition, a constant sequence of {Bt} satisfying Bt = B̄,
and sequences of aggregate shocks, a rational expectations equilibrium
is a stochastic sequence of prices and inflation {it, wt,Πt}, household
allocations {bt, nt, ct, λt}, aggregates {Yt, Lt,Λt, Dt, Tt} such that
1. Given prices and inflation {it−1, it, wt,Πt}, transfers {Dt, Tt},
household allocations {bt, nt, ct, λt} solve the household’s problem





bt−1 +Dt − Tt








2. Given prices {it, wt} and the consumption {ct}, the intermediate
firms choose {Πt, Yt, Lt, Dt} maximize their profit
c−σt
(














t Πt(1 + Πt)







3. Given prices and inflation {it−1,Πt}, government chooses {it, Tt}
1 + it−1
1 + Πt
Bt−1 = Bt + Tt
it = i+ φΠΠt
4. All markets clear
Lt = nt





The adaptive learning approach typically assumes agents have a correctly
specified forecasting model with unknown parameters. Before defining the locally
rational expectations equilibrium (LREE) for the representative agent model, it is
useful to get the forecasting model for both the households and the intermediate firms.
Note that expectations enter the temporary equilibrium through both Eq.(III.4) and
Eq.(III.18). The state variables are it−1, θt and εt. Consider an approximation of the
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rational expectations equilibrium around the steady state by log-linearization. Note
that the rational expectations equilibrium implies that the linearized solutions for






= ψ̄λ0 + ψ̄
λ
1 · it + ψ̄λ2 · log(θt+1) + ψ̄λ3 · εt+1 (III.28)





1 · it−1 + ψ̄i2 · log(θt) + ψ̄i3 · εt (III.29)
log(θt+1) = ρθ log(θt) + ξ
θ
t+1 (III.30)
εt+1 = ρεεt + ξ
ε
t+1 (III.31)











Define the belief vector and information set as follows.
ψ = [ψ0 ψ1 ψ2 ψ3]
′ (III.33)
xt = [1 it−1 log(θt) εt]
′ (III.34)
The (linearized) rational expectation for household’s shadow price λt+1 at time
t is.
Et(λt+1) = λ̄ exp(ψ̄
′ · xt) (III.35)
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Similarly, the (linearized) rational expectations for intermediate firms’ shadow
price Λt+1 is.
Et(Λt+1) = Λ̄ + Ψ̄
′ · xt (III.36)
where Ψ̄′ is the coefficients of the forecasting model for the intermediate-good
producers. Now, I define the locally rational equilibrium with the forecasting rules
from the linearized rational expectations equilibrium.
Definition 6
Given an initial condition, a constant sequence of {Bt} satisfying
Bt = B̄, and sequences of aggregate shocks, a locally rational
expectations equilibrium is a stochastic sequence of prices and inflation
{it, wt,Πt}, transfers {dt, Tt}, household allocations {bt, nt, ct, λt},
aggregates {Yt, Lt, Ct,Λt, Dt, Tt}, and agent beliefs {ψt,Ψt} such that
1. Given prices and inflation {it−1, it, wt,Πt}, household belief {ψt}, and
household allocations {bt, nt, ct, λt} solve the household’s problem.





bt−1 +Dt − Tt













2. Given prices {wt} and the consumption {ct}, the intermediate firms
choose {Πt, Yt, Lt, Dt} maximize their profit.
c−σt
(














t Πt(1 + Πt)







EΨt Λt+1 = Λ̄ + Ψ
′
t−1xt




Bt−1 = Bt + Tt
it = i+ φΠΠt + εt
4. All markets clear as follows.
Lt = nt






5. Agents belief update through the recursive least square algorithm as
follows.
Rt = Rt−1 + γt(xtx
′
t −Rt−1)
ψt = ψt−1 + γtR
−1
t xt(λt − ψ′t−1xt)
Ψt = Ψt−1 + γtR
−1
t xt(Λt −Ψ′t−1xt)
Note that the household beliefs and the intermediate firms’ beliefs enter the state
space, and thus the state variables for this dynamic now are it−1, θt, εt, ψt−1, Ψt−1
and the temporary equilibrium is defined as.
T E(it−1, θt, εt, ψt−1,Ψt−1)→ (it, wt,Πt, bt, nt, ct, λt, Yt, Lt, Ct,Λt, Dt, Tt, ψt,Ψt)
(III.37)
III.4.2 Heterogeneous Agent
This subsection introduces three different definitions of equilibria with
heterogeneous agents: stationary recursive equilibrium, stochastic recursive
equilibrium, and locally rational stochastic recursive equilibrium. Suppressing all
of the aggregate shocks in the model by setting θt = 1 and εt = 0 for all t, I define a
stationary recursive equilibrium.
Definition 7
Given an initial condition, a constant sequence of {Bt} satisfying Bt = B̄,
and suppressing aggregate productivity and monetary shocks, a stationary
recursive equilibrium consists of a measure µ̄ over the state s = (b, z);
policy rules for the households c̄(b, z) where b is the last period’s bond
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holding, n̄(b, z), b̄(b, z), and λ̄(b, z); prices w̄ and ī; aggregate production,
consumption, labor demand, and inflation: Ȳ , C̄, L̄, and Π̄; intermediate
firms shadow price and dividend Λ̄ and D̄ such that.
1. The household policy rules c̄(b, z), n̄(b, z), and b̄(b, z) solve recursive
versions of Eq.(III.2)-(III.6) for all (b, z)













n̄(b, z)χ = c̄(b, z)−σzw̄
where E is taken over z′ against the stochastic process for {zt}.











α w̄ + φΠ̄(1 + Π̄)
)
= φβΛ̄
Λ̄ = C̄−σΠ̄(1 + Π̄)





3. All markets clear
∫
zn̄(b, z)dµ̄(b, z) = L̄∫
c̄(b, z)dµ̄(b, z) = Ȳ − φ
2
Π̄2∫
b̄(b, z)dµ̄(b, z) = B̄
4. µ̄ is stationary under the households policy rules and the transition
matrix for z: for any Borel set B
µ̄(B, z′) = E(µ̄({b : b̄(b, z) ∈ B}, z))
The equilibrium with aggregate shocks then extends in the standard manner by
allowing policy rules, prices, and aggregates to additionally depend on the current
distribution of agents µ and aggregate shocks θ and ε. The definition is given as
follows.
Definition 8
Let household ω’s individual states be (b , z). Given an initial condition,
a constant sequence of {Bt} satisfying Bt = B̄, a stochastic recursive
equilibrium consists of policy rules for the households c(ω;µ, θ, ε),
n(ω;µ, θ, ε), b(ω;µ, θ, ε), and λ(ω;µ, θ, ε); prices w(µ, θ, ε) and i(µ, θ, ε);
aggregate production, consumption, labor demand, and inflation:
Y (µ, θ, ε), C(µ, θ, ε), L(µ, θ, ε), and Π(µ, θ, ε); intermediate firms shadow
price and dividend Λ(µ, θ, ε) and D(µ, θ, ε), and a law of motion H(µ, θ, ε)
for µ such that
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1. The policy rules c(ω;µ, θ, ε), n(ω;µ, θ, ε), b(ω;µ, θ, ε), and λ(ω;µ, θ, ε)
solve recursive version of Eq.(III.2)-(III.6) for all ω, µ, and θ taking
pricing functions r(µ, θ, ε), w(µ, θ, ε) and the law of motion H(µ, θ, ε)
as given
c(ω;µ, θ, ε) + b(ω;µ, θ, ε) =
z(ω)n(ω;µ, θ, ε)w(µ, θ, ε) +
(
1 + i(µ, θ, ε)
1 + Π(µ, θ, ε)
)
b (ω) +D(µ, θ, ε)
c(ω;µ, θ, ε)−σ ≥ β(1 + i(µ, θ, ε))E (λ(ω′;µ′, θ′, ε′)|ω;µ, θ, ε)
λ(ω;µ, θ, ε) =
c(ω;µ, θ, ε)−σ
1 + Π(µ, θ, ε)
nχ(ω;µ, θ, ε) = c(ω;µ, θ, ε)−σz(ω)w(µ, θ, ε)









Y (µ, θ, ε)
1
αw(µ, θ, ε) + φΠ(µ, θ, ε)(1 + Π(µ, θ, ε))
)
= φβEΛ(µ′, θ′, ε′|µ, θ, ε)
Λ(µ, θ, ε) = C(µ, θ, ε)−σΠ(µ, θ, ε)(1 + Π(µ, θ, ε))
D(µ, θ, ε) = Y (µ, θ, ε)− φ
2
Π2(µ, θ, ε)
Y (µ, θ, ε) = θL(µ, θ, ε)α
3. Given prices and inflation {i ,Π(µ, θ, ε)}, government chooses
{i(µ, θ, ε), T (µ, θ, ε)}
T (µ, θ, ε) =
i − Π(µ, θ, ε)
1 + Π(µ, θ, ε)
B̄
i(µ, θ, ε) = i+ φΠΠ(µ, θ, ε) + ε
55
4. All markets clear, and aggregation works as follows.
∫
z(ω)n(ω;µ, θ, ε)dω = L(µ, θ, ε)∫
c(ω;µ, θ, ε)dω = Y (µ, θ, ε)− φ
2
Π2(µ, θ, ε)∫
b(ω;µ, θ, ε)dω = B̄∫
c(ω;µ, θ, ε)dω = C(µ, θ, ε)
5. The law of motion for measure µ matches the properties of the
stochastic processes and the profile of individual household policy
rules.
The difficulty faced in solving a stochastic recursive equilibrium lies in the fact
that policy rules and the law of motion depend on µ, a high dimensional object.
The solution also imposes strong assumptions on households’ knowledge about the
economy’s structure and how it evolves. As a comparison for the locally rational
solution, which is defined as follows, I use the approach introduced by Reiter (2009)
to approximate the rational expectations solution for the heterogeneous agents model.
Definition 9
Let household ω’s individual states be (b , z, ψ) where ψ is the estimates
of the coefficients in the forecasting rules used by agents. Given an
initial condition, a constant sequence of {Bt} satisfying Bt = B̄, and
sequences of aggregate shocks, a locally rational stochastic recursive
dynamics consists of policy rules for the households c(ω; θ, ε), n(ω; θ, ε),
b(ω; θ, ε), and λ(ω; θ, ε); prices w(θ, ε) and i(θ, ε); aggregate production,
consumption, labor demand, and inflation: Y (θ, ε), C(θ, ε), L(θ, ε), and
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Π(θ, ε); intermediate firms shadow price and dividend Λ(θ, ε) and D(θ, ε)
and beliefs Ψ(θ, ε) such that
1. The policy rules c(ω; θ, ε), n(ω; θ, ε), b(ω; θ, ε), and λ(ω; θ, ε) solve
recursive version of Eq.(III.2)-(III.6) for all ω, θ, and ε taking pricing
functions r(θ, ε), w(θ, ε) as given
c(ω; θ, ε) + b(ω; θ, ε) = z(ω)n(ω; θ, ε)w(θ, ε) +
(
1 + i(θ, ε)
1 + Π(θ, ε)
)
b (ω) +D(θ, ε)
c(ω; θ, ε)−σ ≥ β(1 + i(θ, ε))E (ω′; θ′, ε′|ω, θ, ε)
λ(ω; θ, ε) =
c(ω; θ, ε)−σ
1 + Π(θ, ε)
nχ(ω; θ, ε) = c(ω; θ, ε)−σz(ω)w(θ, ε)











αw(θ, ε) + φΠ(θ, ε)(1 + Π(θ, ε))
)
= φβEΛ(θ′, ε′|θ, ε)
Λ(θ, ε) = C(θ, ε)−σΠ(θ, ε)(1 + Π(θ, ε))
D(θ, ε) = Y (θ, ε)− φ
2
Π2(θ, ε)
Y (θ, ε) = θL(θ, ε)α
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3. All markets clear
∫
z(ω)n(ω; θ, ε)dω = L(θ, ε)∫
c(ω; θ, ε)dω = Y (θ, ε)− φ
2
Π2(θ, ε)∫
b(ω; θ, ε)dω = B̄∫
c(ω, θ, ε)dω = C(θ, ε)
4. Given prices and inflation {i ,Π(θ, ε)}, government chooses
{i(θ, ε), T (θ, ε)}
T (θ, ε) =
i − Π(θ, ε)
1 + Π(θ, ε)
B̄
i(θ, ε) = i+ φΠΠ(θ, ε) + ε
5. All households and intermediate-good producers update their
estimates of coefficients in their forecasting model according to a
recursive least square learning rule with exogenous sequences of
gains.
R = R + γ(xx′ −R )
ψ(ω) = ψ (ω) + γR−1x(λ− x′ψ (ω))
Ψ = Ψ + γR−1x(Λ− x′Ψ )
We are ready to define the locally rational expectations equilibrium as a restricted
perceptions equilibrium based on the definition of locally rational recursive dynamics.
The folk theorem of the learning literature states that the long-run beliefs will
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converge to a restricted perceptions equilibrium (RPE) if the equilibrium is E- stable.
Intuitively, RPE is characterized by self-confirming beliefs. Hold beliefs fixed at
ψt = ψ̄ for all t and all agents and Ψt = Ψ̄ for the representative firm. Feed these
fixed beliefs ψt and Ψt into the locally rational recursive dynamics without the belief
evolving part. Let Λh(ψ̄) and Λf (Ψ̄) be the induced ergodic distribution of beliefs
for households and the intermediate firm,. Let the shadow prices be λt+1 and Λt+1
for the households and the intermediate firm. The information set is Xt from the
dynamics. We can construct the linear projection of log(λ/λ̄) on X under measure
Λ(ψ̄) and . Effectively, the locally rational recursive dynamics defines a T-map for
the agents beliefs with the form ψ̄′ = Th(ψ̄) and Ψ̄
′ = Tf (Ψ̄). Here
Th(ψ̄) = EΛh(ψ̄)[XX
′]−1EΛh(ψ̄)[X log(λ/λ̄)]
Tf (Ψ̄) = EΛf (Ψ̄)[XX
′]−1EΛf (Ψ̄)[X log(Λ/Λ̄)]
Definition 10
A locally rational expectations equilibrium is a locally rational recursive
dynamics with the ergodic distributions of the beliefs ψ∗ such that
ψ∗ = EΛh(ψ∗)[XX
′]−1EΛh(ψ∗)[X log(λ/λ̄)]
Ψ∗ = EΛa(Ψ∗)[XX ′]−1EΛa(Ψ∗)[X log(Λ/Λ̄)]
This framework approximately nests the rational expectations equilibrium, and the
LREE is a type of restricted perception equilibrium because the agents use a simplified
learning rule, and the coefficients are self-referential from the agents’ perspective.
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III.5 Calibration and Computation
I choose three sets of parameters: (i) parameters related to household preferences,
productions, and aggregate shocks; (ii) initial conditions; and (iii) stochastic processes
for idiosyncratic shocks. The computation method follows the algorithm used in
Evans, Li, and McGough (2019). I consider small supports for the aggregate shocks
for the baseline model so that the nominal interest rate does not or rarely go below zero
in simulations. The implication of introducing a zero lower bound will be explored
in the extension of the paper in the future. For simplicity, I set the inflation trend
to be zero. Note that a non-zero inflation trend can have significant implications for
the model behavior.
III.5.1 Preferences, Productions and Aggregate Shocks
The parameters match standard representative agent calibrations such as
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) and Siu (2004). I set the CES parameters for
household on consumption and labor at σ = 2, χ = 2, and the discount factor β
is set so that the targeted nominal interest rate is at ī = 0.02. The firms operate
a decreasing return to scale technology so that the labor income accounts for 65%
of the total output. To a first-order approximation, the steady-state markups of
the intermediate firms are set to be 20%, which implies the elasticity of substitution
among the intermediate goods is at ν = 6. The parameter for the adjustment cost
is set at φ = 20 to match the slope of the Philips curve, as estimated by Sbordone
(2002). The bond supply from the government is set so that the ratio of national debt
to GDP is 75%. Targeted inflation is 0%. The inflation feedback parameter is set to
be φΠ = 2.0, which means the central bank aggressively targets the inflation rate. For
example, Coibion (2012) shows that the non-zero inflation trend subject to zero-bound
interest rates has major implications on optimal monetary policy design. Ascari and
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Sbordone (2014) found that a new Keynesian model with a non-zero inflation trend
is associated with a less stable and more volatile economy and tends to destabilize
inflation expectations. For illustration that learning can introduce movements to the
aggregate variable when combined with agent-heterogeneity, we use a simple non-zero
inflation trend for the calibration.
III.5.2 Initial Conditions and Learning
For the representative agent model, the initial conditions for each variable are
at the steady-state level. The initial conditions are drawn from the stationary
distribution of the stationary recursive equilibrium for the heterogeneous agent model.
For the bounded rational computations, the initial beliefs are set to be (0,−1,−1,−1)
for both ψ0 and Ψ0. The exogenous gain process is set to be constant at level γt = 0.01.
III.5.3 Stochastic Processes
I calibrate the income process following Krueger, who estimated a process for
disposable earnings after taxes and transfers. They estimated an annual persistence
of innovations to be ρθ = 0.815 with a standard deviation of σθ = 0.014. I assume the
idiosyncratic log productivity process is the sum of an AR(1) and i.i.d. component.
The monetary policy shocks persistence is that ρε = 0.0625, a set value associated
with a moderately persistent monetary shock, and the standard deviation for the
shock is σε = 0.0025, which corresponds to 25 basis points.The details of calibrations
are summarized in Table (1). Figure (1) shows the wealth distribution generated by
the calibrated model. It shows that the stationary distribution for the bond holding
across the agents is very skewed, and
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Variable Moment RA HA
σ CES parameter 2.0000 2.0000
χ Frisch elasticity 2.0000 2.0000
β ī = 0.02 0.9800 0.9320
b Borrowing constraint 0.0000 0.0000
ν 20% markup 6.0000 6.0000
α 66% output → labor 0.7470 0.7470
φ PC (Sbordone 2002) 20.000 20.000
φΠ Taylor feedback 2.0000 2.0000
B̄ B2Y ratio = 75% 0.6900 0.8190
ρθ Krueger et al. (2009) 0.8150 0.8150
σθ Krueger et al. (2009) 0.0140 0.0140
ρε Gali (2015) 0.0625 0.0625
σε Gali (2015) 0.0025 0.0025
ρπ Idio. - 0.9700
σzp Permanent idio. - 0.1960
σzt I.I.D idio. - 0.2300
TABLE 1 Calibrations
III.6 Simulation Results
This section presents the results from the multiple simulations I have
implemented on the model with various settings. In general, there are four sets
of results coming from representative-agent rational expectations equilibrium (RA-
REE), representative-agent locally rational expectations (RA-LREE), heterogeneous-
agent rational expectations equilibrium (HA-REE), and heterogeneous-agent locally
rational expectations equilibrium (HA-LREE).
III.6.1 Representative Agent
Figure (2) is simulated with a representative agent in a locally rational
expectations equilibrium and shows the convergence of beliefs of both households
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FIGURE 1. Stationary Distribution for Bonds Holdings
Note: This histogram contains the stationary distribution for bonds holdings across
the households. The red vertical line represents the average bond holding. This
histogram shows that the distribution is right-skewered with a mass point on the
borrowing constraint.
and intermediate firms. The red dashed lines represent the coefficients obtained from
running a regression of shadow prices on the information set using the simulated
linearized rational expectations equilibrium. It is worth noting that both households
and intermediate firms learn that the interest rate has an ambiguous coefficient in the
learning rule for the future shadow prices. For a representative-agent environment,
the learning rule that includes only the aggregate variables are correctly specified,
and hence the coefficient estimates converge to the rational expectations equilibrium
level.
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FIGURE 2. Beliefs for Households and Intermediate Firms
Note: This figure contains the belief evolution of a representative household. The red
dashed line is the belief counterpart in a linearized rational expectations equilibrium.
The constant learning gain is 0.01.
Consider the impulse responses to a positive innovation in aggregate productivity
of ξθ in a representative-agent economy. Black lines in Figure (3) show how the
economy responds to a 1.4 percentage under rational expectations equilibrium. The
positive productivity shock boosts wage, labor, consumption, output and decreases
nominal interest rate, real interest rate, and inflation. The size of the response has
been converted to the percentage deviation from the steady-state. The interest rates
and inflation rate are two exceptions. The unit measure for the two interest rates
and inflation is one percentage point. Lump-sum tax transfer responds with an initial
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increase that is followed by a decrease. The initial increase in tax transfer is due to
the decline in inflation when the shock arrives. As a result, the outstanding debt puts
more pressure on the government as the interest payment has a higher real value—the
follow-up decrease in tax results from a drop in the real interest rate.




































































FIGURE 3. IRFs - Representative Agent LREE (Productivity Shock)
Note: This figure contains the impulse response functions from a positive
productivity shock in a locally rational expectations equilibrium with a representative
agent. The blue dashed lines are the IRF’s from LREE with a 95% interval. The
black lines are the IRF’s from REE. Note that the median of IRF’s from LREE aligns
almost exactly with the IRF’s from REE. The constant learning gain is 0.01.
I also consider the impulse responses to a positive innovation in the monetary
policy rule ξε in a representative-agent economy. Black lines in Figure (4) show how
the economy responds to a 0.25 percentage-point shock under rational expectations
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equilibrium. The positive monetary shock decreases wage, labor, consumption,
output, and inflation and increases nominal interest rates and real interest rates. Note
that the persistence for monetary shocks is low, and thus the effects of innovation in
monetary shock disappear after 5 periods (years). For all variables other than tax
transfer, most of the response happens in the same period when the shock arrives,
and the second period’s impact is damped down very quickly. For tax transfer, the
shock has a significant impact in both the first and second periods, but the reasons are
different. The government takes a higher tax in the first period because of deflation
caused by positive monetary shock. In the second period, the tax increases further
due to higher real interest in the previous period.
Now I compare the impulse response functions simulated from LREE to the
ones from REE with the representative agent. To simulate a set of IRF’s with
LREE, I draw the state variables from the ergodic distribution after the estimates
for the coefficients of the forecasting rules are settled. I repeat 500 times and plot
the responses at 0.25 percentile, median, and 99.75 percentile, represented by the
blue dashed lines. As shown in Figure (3) and Figure (4), the IRF’s simulated from
LREE align with the IRF’s simulated from REE. Farhi and Werning (2017) show that
only when the model includes both agent heterogeneity with incomplete markets and
bounded rationality is a departure from the fully rational benchmark model. Each
of these two frictions, in isolation, would not affect the dynamics of the model. My
result from this stage serves as a confirmation of their finding. It also shows that
my definition of temporary equilibrium definition is correctly specified. Figure (2)
is simulated with 10, 000 agents in a locally rational expectations equilibrium and
shows the convergence of beliefs of both households and intermediate firms. This
result matches the result from the previous chapter. The intuition here is that the
agents are learning with the correctly specified forecasting rule, and hence the beliefs
converge to the actual rational expectations equilibrium beliefs over time. I will
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show later that when heterogeneity is introduced in the model, the LREE and REE
behave differently with a learning rule that only includes the aggregate shocks under
a moderate constant learning gain. In a representative-agent model, agents’ asset
holding doesn’t deviate too far from the steady-state level, and hence the forecasting
rule doesn’t need to include the individual variable.
































































FIGURE 4. IRFs - Representative Agent LREE (Monetary Shock)
Note: This figure contains the impulse response functions from a positive monetary
shock in a locally rational expectations equilibrium with a representative agent. The
blue dashed lines are the IRF’s from LREE with a 95% interval. The black lines are
the IRF’s from REE. The constant learning gain is 0.01.
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III.6.2 Heterogeneous Agent
Now I simulate the impulse response functions from LREE with heterogeneous
agents. The method used for simulation is based on the previous chapter. I draw
from the ergonomic distribution of the state variables, including the profile of bonds
holding, the profile of beliefs, lagged interest rate, and the variance-covariance matrix
for the learning rule. I repeat 500 times and plot the responses at 0.25 percentile,
median, and 99.75 percentile, represented by the three blue dashed lines, respectively.
Note that the constant learning gain is 0.01, which is moderate. As a result, the rich
agents use long historical data from the periods when they were poor and hence
behave more like a poor-type agent in the rational expectations counterpart.
Figure (5) shows how endogenous variables respond to a one-standard deviation
of negative productivity shock. It indicates that HA-REE predicts a stronger response
of nominal interest rate, inflation, and real interest rate to a one-standard-deviation
increase in productivity shock. HA-REE also predicts a weaker response of wage and
hours compared to the HA-LREE. Figure (6) also shows that the responses predicted
by HA-REE are similar to those predicted by HA-LREE with a one-standard-
deviation of monetary shock. These results further confirm the conclusions from
the last chapter. In a heterogeneous-agents setting, an adaptive learning rule that
leaves out the individual variables induces deviations in impulse response functions
from the REE.
III.7 Distributional Effects
I include the impulse response functions for the Gini index as a measurement for
the second-order moment of the wealth distribution. The Gini index is a single number
used for measuring the degree of inequality in a distribution. A higher concentration
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FIGURE 5. IRFs - Heterogeneous Agent LREE (Productivity Shock)
Note: This figure contains the impulse response functions from a positive
productivity shock in a locally rational expectations equilibrium with a large number
of (100, 000) heterogeneous agents. The blue dashed lines are the IRF’s from LREE
with a 95% interval. The constant learning gain is 0.01.
in wealth would translate to a higher Gini index. Although the magnitude of the
Gini index does not match the US income data,1 the directions in which the wealth
1A more detailed heterogeneous agent model can be used to match the wealth distribution better.
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FIGURE 6. IRFs - Heterogeneous Agent LREE (Monetary Shock)
Note: This figure contains the impulse response functions from a positive monetary
shock in a locally rational expectations equilibrium with a large number of
heterogeneous agents. The blue dashed lines are the IRF’s from LREE with a 95%
interval. The constant learning gain is 0.01.
inequality goes are still indicative. When the HANK economy receives an unexpected
one-standard-deviation positive productivity shock, the Gini index goes up when
the shock arrives. An immediate decrease follows this initial increase in the first
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period, and the index goes back to the stationary distribution as the magnitude of
the productivity shock damps down.
The wealthy agents mostly rely on the real interests from the bonds they hold
from the last period, and the agents with less bond holding rely primarily on labor
income. The initial increase in “inequality” arises from the unexpected deflation
caused by productivity shock. Although the poor agents receive a higher labor income
in the first period, the effect on inequality is compensated by the rich agents receiving
a higher real interest caused by a lower inflation rate. The following-up decrease in the
Gini index results from a higher wage rate and a lower real interest rate. I implement
a similar experiment with a 25-basis-point positive monetary shock. In this case, the
immediate response of the Gini index is ambiguous. After the first period, there is
an increase in the Gini index. This initial inertia in the Gini index occurs because
there is a decrease in the inflation rate and a wage increase. The following increase is
due to both a higher real interest rate and a lower wage rate. I make two comments.
First, the Gini index’s movement indicates that inequality is exacerbated during a
recession, which happens when the economy receives a negative productivity shock
or a positive monetary shock. Second, the monetary shock has a long-lasting effect
on wealth inequality, documented by Coibian (2017) et al. This paper provides the
first theoretical result that matches what has been observed in the data.
To understand what is driving the result behind the movements in the Gini
index, we need to dive into how different groups of agents from different asset brackets
react to aggregate shocks. I separate the agents from the ergodic distribution from
the LREE dynamics into ten different groups based on their asset holding. The
movement in the bond holding is derived precisely the same way from the ergodic
distribution as in the previous impulse response functions. The blue line represents
the impulse responses of the wealthiest ten percent agents, whereas the other nine
dashed lines represent the bottom 90% agents. Comparing the shapes of the blue lines
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to the bottom right panel of Figure (5) and Figure (6), one can see that most of the
movement in the Gini coefficient can be explained by the wealthiest group of agents in
the economy. This dynamic driven by the very upper end of the wealth distribution
matches the empirical data. For example, the Congressional Budget Office (2011)
found that the top wealthy households played a considerable role in income inequality
dynamics since 1980. Specifically, the rapid growth of average market wealth for the
top 1 percent of the population contributed to the increase in household income
dispersion between 1979 and 2007. From the previous chapter, we can conclude that
the behavior deviation for the rich agents in this learning environment comes from
the low constant learning gain with a misspecified learning rule that does not include
individual variables. These top rich agents behave more like poor-type agents, and
their behaviors drive the movement in the wealth distribution.
III.8 Conclusion
This chapter extends the local rationality concept from the previous chapter
to a heterogeneous-agent New Keynesian model. The HANK-type models impose
strong assumptions on what the agents understand about the model under a rational
expectations equilibrium. I show that the rational expectations equilibrium can be
learned through adaptive learning by locally rational agents.
The simulation results in this more complex environment are comparable to the
real business cycle model. I primarily focus on the learning rule that only includes
the aggregate variables and see how the economy behaves compared to the rational
expectations. After a series of experiments, I show that the impulse responses are
different in the locally rational expectations equilibrium compared to the rational
expectations when the model presents heterogeneity. Specifically, I investigate how
the wealth inequality responds to aggregate shocks and find that the HANK model
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(a) Impulse Response Functions - Productivity Shock
(b) Impulse Response Functions - Monetary Shock
FIGURE 7. IRFs from Top-Ten Percent Richest Agent
Note: This top panel shows the impulse response function for the bond holding
from the top-ten percent richest agent in the economy in response to a one-standard-
deviation negative productivity shock. The bottom panel shows the impulse response
function for the bond holding from the top-ten percent richest agent in the economy
in response to a one-standard-deviation monetary shock. The dashed lines in both
panels represent the other nine groups’ impulse responses.
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can only produce movement in the inequality when the agents are adaptive learners
for their future shadow price. I further show that the distributional effects are driven
mainly by the top-tier wealthy agents in the locally rational model. These agents
behave more like poor-type agents because they include a long history of personal
data, including the periods when they held less bond. As a result, these agents are
not responding to the aggregate shocks the way they are supposed to with rational
expectations equilibrium.
The theoretical findings match the empirical evidence that monetary shocks
can have distributional effects on income and wealth. The HANK model in
rational expectations equilibrium doesn’t produce the same kind of movement in
the distributions. In contrast, local rationality adds an extra layer of friction to the
model and can have the distributional movement that matches data. Specifically,
Coibian et al. (2007) find that a contractionary monetary distribution can make
the distribution more unequal. This chapter supports the empirical evidence from a
theoretical perspective based on adaptive learning. The future goal of this research
agenda can study the implication of local rationality in a more realistic new Keynesian
model that includes a non-zero inflation trend. The adaptive learning environment







This paper investigates the implication of introducing multiple finite-state
Markov extrinsic sunspot processes in a general univariate forward-looking model. In
this model, each agent only observes a subset of the sunspots. There are adaptively
stable Markov stationary sunspot equilibria (SSEs) near an indeterminate steady-
state for both the linear and nonlinear cases. In the linear case, each sunspot
process is associated with a knife-edged serial correlation condition, known as the
resonant frequency condition. In the nonlinear case, the serial-correlation condition
associated with each sunspot process is no longer knife-edged. In both cases, each
serial correlation condition depends on the proportion of agents who observe that
sunspot. As long as one sunspot process satisfies its serial correlation condition,
adaptively stable SSEs exist. I illustrate the results using a standard version of
the Samuelson overlapping generations model of money where agent-level beliefs are
treated carefully. One of the criticisms for sunspot equilibrium literature is that no
real-world sunspot has been identified.
In macroeconomic models of dynamic economies with forward-looking agents,
steady states can be indeterminate. Indeterminacy occurs when an infinite number
of rational expectations equilibria (REE) are associated with such a steady state. The
concept of indeterminacy is closely related to the idea of a sunspot equilibrium. The
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idea is that, in the presence of indeterminacy, a rational expectations equilibrium path
can exhibit fluctuations that depend on external shocks called sunspots. The sunspots
are extrinsic in the sense that they are not based on model fundamentals. This
dependency is self-fulfilling and arises when agents condition their expectations on
sunspots, and the sunspots influence the economy only through agents’ expectations.
In a proper sunspot equilibrium, the allocation of resources depends on sunspots in a
non-trivial manner. Fluctuations are speculative and driven solely by expectations.
Sunspots in these solutions often follow a stationary stochastic process, and
these self-fulfilling rational expectations solutions are commonly called stationary
sunspot equilibria (SSE.) Contrary to the conventional wisdom that only intrinsic
uncertainty should influence economic activity, the sunspots model explains volatility
without going beyond the rational expectations framework. Several authors first
documented the existence of rational expectations solutions driven by extrinsic
stochastic processes. Shell (1977) provided the first sunspots model in an overlapping-
generations exchange economy with fiat money. Azariadis (1981) was the first
published paper to show that sunspots may be responsible for business cycles. Cass
and Shell (1983) explored the conditions under which sunspots solutions arise and
offered welfare analysis using an overlapping-generations economy. Azariadis and
Guesnerie (1984) establish that the existence of two-period cycles is a sufficient
condition for the existence of a two-state stationary sunspot equilibrium. Their
conclusions were obtained in a particular class of overlapping generations economies.
Guesnerie (1986) provided sufficient conditions for the existence of sunspot equilibria
near deterministic cycles in a broader class of models with multiple commodities.
All of the early existence results for sunspot equilibria were initially obtained in
simple stylized models, and the conclusions were not generalizable. The first generic
result that provides criterion on indeterminacy was provided by Blanchard and Kahn
(1980). They present a practical technique for determining whether a multivariate
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linear model has a unique equilibrium. The method is based on matrix eigenvalue
decomposition and compares the number of explosive eigenvalues in the coefficient
matrix to the number of variables that are not predetermined. An explosive eigenvalue
is associated with a restriction since the expectation of future non-predetermined
variables does not grow to infinity. All the restrictions collectively describe the law
of motion for the non-predetermined variables in a way that is aligned with the
rational expectations hypothesis. Depending on the number of restrictions implied
by explosive eigenvalues and the number of non-predetermined variables, there might
be no equilibrium, one unique equilibrium, or multiple equilibria. The method of
Blanchard and Kahn is demonstrated to determine the existence and uniqueness of
REE solutions. Still, the same technique can also be applied to establish the existence
of sunspot equilibria in a linear model. Sunspot equilibria can be constructed in an
easily analyzed vector autoregressive form, and the support of the sunspots can be
either continuous or discrete. Sims (2000) uses generalized Schur decomposition to
improve Blanchard and Kahn’s technique to accommodate a broader collection of
models researchers might encounter in practice. Woodford (1986) extends the results
of Blanchard and Kahn to a general nonlinear model. He applies an implicit function
theorem through a local analysis and shows that a nonlinear model’s local equilibrium
uniqueness is implied by uniqueness in the linearized model.
The existence of SSE alone does not justify its importance. A natural question
to ask is whether agents will learn to believe in sunspots in the first place. Separate
literature on equilibrium selection tries to answer this question. Woodford (1990)
shows that, under some plausible assumptions, agents that follow adaptive learning
rules may learn to coordinate their expectations and actions on sunspots. The
stability result is obtained in a stylized model based on global analysis using the
structure of the invariant set under learning and the index number theorem of
Poincare-Hopf. However, the approach of Woodford cannot be used to locate stable
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sunspots. Evans and Honkapohja provide stability conditions for SSEs in several
papers. Evans and Honkapohja’s method works in a generic model class and can
provide information about the stable sunspots’ location. In particular, Evans and
Honkapohja (1994) show that, in a general class of nonlinear models, E-stability
gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for the local stability of finite-state SSEs
near a deterministic cycle under adaptive learning. The stability of SSEs in a small
neighborhood of cyclic equilibria is implied by the stability of the equilibria associated
with the deterministic cycles. The proof uses the property that the determinate of
a matrix is a continuous function in its eigenvalues. Evans and Honkapohja (2003a)
consider a forward-looking linear model and provide conditions under which SSEs
near a deterministic steady state are stable under learning. They also show that
agents’ representation in the learning process matters for the stability results, and
the autoregressive solutions are never stable under learning. A resonant frequency
condition must be satisfied for the SSE solution to be stable.
The stability results of SSEs near a deterministic steady state in a linear
model extend to the nonlinear version of the model. In a companion paper of
Evans and Honkapohja (2003b), they show that stability results carry over to the
corresponding nonlinear model in a steady-state neighborhood. The proof relies
on a local bifurcation, which arises when the differential equation governing the
stability has one eigenvalue set to be zero. Evans and McGough (2005a) find that
an SSE may be stable if the associated sunspot process’s serial correlation exhibits
the resonant frequency. In a separate paper, Evans and McGough (2011) also show
that finite-state Markov sunspots’ stability implies all sunspots are stable under
learning with common factor representations. Evans and McGough (2018) study
the existence and stability of near-rational sunspot equilibria (NRSE) in forward-
looking nonlinear models where agents use the optimal linear forecasting model
among similarly specified linear models sunspot process has continuous support.
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They provide generic existence results for continuous-support sunspot equilibria in
nonlinear models, and the solutions are constructive with simple recursive forms.
Sunspot equilibria remained a purely theoretical topic until several authors
explored the possibility of fitting sunspot-driven business cycles into applied dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models. Benhabib and Farmer (1994) provide a simple
condition for indeterminacy in a one-sector growth model. The condition requires
increasing returns to scale for aggregate technology should be large enough to imply
the aggregate labor demand curve is upward-sloping and steeper than the labor supply
curve. Caballero and Lyons (1994) and Baxter and King (1991) estimate externalities
to be large and in the plausible range of indeterminacy. Farmer and Guo (1994)
develop a calibrated, nonconvex real business cycle model that well-matched the data.
The model uses only sunspot processes as an exogenous stochastic driver to explain
business cycle co-movements. The model matches the data better than the standard
real business cycle (RBC) models with fundamental shocks.
Farmer and Guo demonstrate that the models with indeterminate equilibria
can explain the macroeconomic data at business cycle frequencies that traditional
RBC models cannot. Gali and Jordi (1994) developed an alternative way of
introducing nonconvexity into RBC models. Instead of relying on the presence
of large increasing returns, their model incorporates monopolistic competition and
endogenous markups to allow for sunspot equilibria and sunspot-driven fluctuations.
However, more estimates obtained later in the literature called into question these
results by showing that the early estimates of externalities were overstated. See
Basu and Fernald (1994) and Norrbin (1993) for the new estimates. Following
that, researchers established different nonconvexities to generate indeterminacy
with empirically plausible calibrations. For example, Benhabib and Farmer (1996)
introduce mild increasing returns to scale by building sector-specific externalities
into a two-sector model. Specifically, their model includes externalities in both the
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consumption goods sector and the investment goods sector. Their model does not
need large external effects that give rise to an upward-sloping labor demand curve.
Their two-sector model allows for indeterminacy within the regions of reasonable
estimates at the industry level. However, several empirical researchers found that
the returns to scale are roughly constant by refining the earlier findings of Hall
(1990) on disaggregated US data. In response to this new finding, Benhabib, Meng,
and Nishmura (2000) develop an RBC model with multiple sectors that generate
indeterminacy without increasing returns-to-scale. Some authors also explored the
possibility of introducing nonconvexity by assuming alternative utility functions. For
example, Bennett and Farmer (2000) show that a one-sector growth model with
preferences that are non-separable in consumption and leisure allows for indeterminate
equilibria when demand and supply curves have the standard slopes. Hintermaier
(2002) proves in a general setup that utility functions compatible with indeterminacy
are not concave if the elasticity of scale is lower than the inverse of the labor share
in production.
A separate but related literature has risen to investigate whether any of the
indeterminate equilibria in these nonconvex RBC models are stable under learning.
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) find that the sunspot equilibria studied by Farmer
and Guo (1994) were not stable. Evans and McGough (2005b) study the sunspot
solutions’ stability properties under both the general form representation and the
common factor representation in two alternative information assumptions. They
find that there are large parameter regions in which sunspot solutions are stable
for the reduced form. However, when the reduced form parameters are restricted
to match the calibrated structural models, stable sunspot equilibria only exist for
a tiny part of the standard indeterminacy region. The stability result is also
subject to the timing assumption. Evans and McGough call this observation the
stability puzzle in nonconvex economies. Evans and McGough (2005b) obtained
80
the stability and instability regions numerically. Duffy and Xiao (2006) consider a
host of sunspot-driven RBC type models and provide analytic conditions for sunspot
equilibria to be stable under learning. They prove analytically that structural model
parameter restrictions imply instability of the indeterminate solutions. McGough,
Meng, and Xue (2013) study a one-sector RBC model with externalities. They find
that the Benhabib-Farmer condition that the labor-demand curve is upward-sloping
and steeper than the labor-supply curve is necessary for joint indeterminacy and
E-stability.
In addition to RBC-type models, the idea of indeterminacy and sunspot-driven
fluctuations also applies to other dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. For
example, extensive literature has arisen to warn of sunspot equilibria’s consequences
from a poorly designed monetary policy. The prospect of the agents coordinating on
some external shocks causes inefficient fluctuations. Monetary policies should ensure
sunspot-driven volatility does not arise. Many authors found that indeterminacy
occurs if the monetary authority follows an interest rate rule that does not respond
aggressively to inflation changes. King (2000) provides a detailed description of
micro-founded New IS-LM models that incorporate expectation terms in both IS
and Phillips Curve. The paper suggests the feedback parameter on inflation be
large in the interest rule, which is in line with Taylor’s Rule. Clarida, Gali, and
Certler (2000) estimate the monetary policy rules before and after Paul Volcker was
appointed chairman of the Board of Federal Reserve System. They find that the
interest rule was accommodative in the pre-Volcker year and aggressive in the post-
Volcker year. This paper applies the pre-Volcker rule to a calibrated New Keynesian
(NK) model and finds the accommodative rule leaves open the possibility of sunspot-
driven fluctuations. They argue that substantial volatility in inflation and output
observed in the late sixties and seventies can be partially explained by the self-fulfilling
changes in expectations. They also show that the NK model calibrated according to
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the post-Volcker rule is instead determined, matching the smaller variance of inflation
and output observed in the eighties. Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) point out that
determinacy is a property that cannot be established using single-equation methods.
Instead, they estimate a fully specified rational expectations model using a Bayesian
approach. They specify a prior probability distribution over parameters with equal
weights on determinate and indeterminate regions. Using US data on the output gap,
the interest rate, and the inflation rate, Lubik and Schorfheide compute these regions’
posterior odds ratios. Their findings strongly confirm that the pre-Volcker rule was
destabilizing.
The indeterminacy in these monetary models raises whether sunspot equilibria
in the New Keynesian models are stable under learning. Honkapohja and Mitra
(2004) were the first to consider a purely forward-looking AS equation with various
interest rules, including those dependent on current, lagged, and expected inflation
and output gap. They find that sunspot-driven equilibria they consider may be stable
only if the interest rate rule depends on expected inflation and expected output gap.
However, their initial conclusion only included the general form representation, which
is a linear function of lagged endogenous variables and a sunspot variable taking the
form of a martingale difference sequence. Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) find that
previously-thought unstable sunspot equilibria can also be stable when represented as
the common factor representation and argue that stability analysis must incorporate
both general form and common factor representations. Another related literature
concerns if agents can coordinate with different monetary policy designs, so the steady
states are determinate. Bullard and Mitra (2002) study the stability property of a
broad class of variants of the Taylor interest rate rule and find learnability of a unique
rational expectations equilibrium is not guaranteed. They argue monetary policy
should take into account the learnability constraints. Evans and Honkapohja (2003a)
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analyze learnability in a similar model and consider different ways of implementing
optimal monetary policy under discretion.
So far, all of the existence and stability results derive within a representative
agent framework. No heterogeneity exists across the agents - every agent shares the
same information sets and beliefs and makes the same decisions. There are advantages
to working with a representative agent. It is easy to work with one decision-maker
instead of simultaneously analyzing many different decisions. However, rational
expectations equilibria, including sunspot equilibria, can be mostly thought of as
an outcome of a coordination game participated by a large number of rational agents.
In an REE, each agent’s decision is optimal, given what other agents’ decisions are. In
models of indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria, using a representative agent imposes
two implicit assumptions on the economy: 1. Every agent is open to the idea that
the sunspot variable may matter for the economy’s outcomes. In the specification,
every agent uses the same learning rule that depends on the sunspot variable. 2.
There is only one sunspot process that all agents observe, and agents coordinate their
actions on this one sunspot variable. In practice, there are two ways to deviate from
the representative-agent framework. 3. Only a proportion of the agents believe in
the sunspot, and the rest do not believe the economy fluctuates according to the
sunspot. There are multiple sunspot processes and agents “disagree” on which of the
sunspots matters. 4. Intuitively, either deviation would make a sunspot equilibrium
less likely to exist, or if it does exist, more difficult to be stable. Departure from the
representative-agent framework can serve as a “robust test” for sunspot equilibria’
existence and stability. This paper proves that adaptively stable sunspot-driven
equilibria can still exist under either deviation. I provide the necessary and sufficient
conditions for sunspot equilibria’ existence and stability near an indeterminate steady
state in a general univariate forward-looking model. I show that the results obtained
in Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) extend naturally to models with heterogeneous
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beliefs. I introduce multiple extrinsic finite-state Markov sunspot processes in a
general univariate model. Expectational heterogeneity rises naturally, as each agent
either does not observe any sunspots or observes only one of the sunspots. I prove
the existence of restricted perception stationary sunspot equilibria (SSE) near an
indeterminate steady state. Several insights are provided regarding the stability
result. In a linear model, each sunspot process is associated with a knife-edged
restriction on its serial correlation. In a nonlinear model, the condition is no longer
knife-edged. The existence of E-stable SSE only requires one of the potentially
many sunspot processes to satisfy its restriction. Suppose a smaller proportion of
agents observe a sunspot process. In that case, it needs more substantial negative
feedback from expectations at the steady-state to meet the RFC associated with that
sunspot process. A standard version of the Samuelson overlapping generations model
of money is used to illustrate the results. This paper also contributes to recent studies
on the topic of bounded rationality with heterogeneous agents. Branch and Evans
(2005) introduce intrinsic heterogeneity in expectation formation. In their model,
agents choose from a list of misspecified econometric models. Honkapohja and Mitra
(2006) show how different forms of heterogeneity in structure, forecasting models,
and adaptive learning rules affect the conditions for convergence of adaptive learning
towards REE.
This chapter shows that E-stable sunspot equilibria do not have to depend on
only one sunspot. Agents can observe multiple stochastic signals, and the model
can still present self-fulfilling fluctuations. This finding from the heterogeneous-agent
environment helps induce the existence and stability of sunspot equilibria. However,
the analytical result also shows that the region for E-stable sunspot equilibria to exist
shrinks when we introduce more sunspots in the model. Generally, the model needs
to have stronger negative feedback at the steady state when there are more random
processes used by the agents as sunspots. In this sense, the finding of the chapter
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impedes the existence of stable sunspot equilibria. The dynamic selection result of
the paper shows that agents, in general, would prefer the learning rule that includes
sunspot variables because this type of learning rule nest the steady state learning rule.
At worst, the learning rule with sunspots can do as well as the steady-state learning
rule in terms of forecasting accuracy. This chapter balances all aspects and concludes
that the heterogeneous-agent environment would help induce sunspot equilibria.
IV.2 Model




H(Eωt [G(yt+1)|Iωt ])dω. (IV.1)
Here y is a univariate endogenous variable, and its law of motion is defined by the
difference equation that involves a continuous of expectational terms index by ω
∈ Ω, where Ω is the set of all agents. Iωt is the information set that is available
to agent ω at time t. Eωt G(yt+1) denotes the conditional expectation of G(yt+1)
held by agent ω at time t given Iωt . Note that E
ω
t G(yt+1) is the true mathematical
conditional expectation of G(yt+1). Functions H : R → R and G : R → R are
both of differentiability class C3. Define function F = H ◦ G : R → R. Assume
throughout that there exist a locally unique steady state ŷ such that ŷ = F (ŷ).
Consider sunspot processes with two states indexed by 1 and 2. Let there be N
independent random variable {st,k}Nk=1, each associated with an exogenous two-state
Markov processes with transition probability matrices {Πk}Nk=1, and st,k = {skτ}τ=tτ=0 is
the kth sunspot state up to time t. Denote Πk = (πki,j) for all k. Every agent observes
either one of processes or none of them. The individual information set Iωt depends
on the agent’s observability of the Markov processes. That is to say, either Iωt = s
t,k
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or Iωt = ∅. Consider a stochastic process for yt that depends on the N exogenous
two-state Markov processes {skt }Nk=1. Denote st = (s1t , s2t , . . . , sNt ) as the profile of
sunspots at time t, and S = {1, 2}N as the set of all possible values the profile vector
can take, i.e. st ∈ S. A rational expectations equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 11
{yt} is an REE if there exists a set {ȳs}s∈S ∈ R2
N
such that yt = ȳs
if st = s and that {yt} satisfies Eq.(IV.1) with Eωt is the mathematical
expectation conditional on information set Iωt .
An immediate REE that follows the definition is yt = ŷ where ŷ is the model’s
locally unique steady state. This solution is referred to as the fundamental solution.
If ȳs1 6= ȳs2 for some s1, s2 ∈ S, the REE is a stationary sunspot equilibrium (SSE).
An interesting observation is that the cyclic order of an SSE can potentially be as
large as 2N , a number that grows exponentially in N .
IV.2.1 Adaptive Learning
To analyze the stability under adaptive learning, I replace the true mathematical
expectation term Eωt in Eq.(IV.1) with Ê
ω
t , which is the subjective expectation held
by agent ω at time t conditional on information Iωt . I categorize agents into two
general types. One type believes that they are always in a steady state, and I call
these agents the steady-state (SS) believers. The other type only observes one sunspot
process and believes that they are in a two-state SSE with yt taking values according
to the observed sunspot. I call these agents the SSE-k believers where k indicates the
sunspot process index they observe. SS believers use the average past value taken by
yt as the estimate for the steady-state. SSE-k believers use the average past value
taken by yt in each state of sunspot s
t,k as the estimates for the values associated








be the estimates of an SSE-k believer. SS believers and SSE-k believers use learning






 φkj,t−1 + (#T kj,t)−1(yt−1 − φkj,t−1) if skt = jφkj,t−1 if skt 6= j
for j = 1, 2. Here T kj,t = {τ ∈ {0, 1, · · · , t − 1}|skτ = j}, and the operator # counts
the number of elements in a set. At time t, an SS believer forms her expectation:
Êωt G(yt+1) = G(φ
0
t ).
An SSE-k believer form her expectations:
Êωt G(yt+1) =
 πk11G(φk1t) + (1− πk11)G(φk2t) if skt = 1(1− πk22)F (φk1t) + πk22G(φk2t) if skt = 2
Note these expectations are point expectations, and this works because the model
is non-stochastic. The learning algorithm is closed by specifying that yt is updated
through the temporary equilibrium implied by Eq.(IV.1). The rest of the paper
analyzes the existence of SSE solutions and their local stability under adaptive
learning by deriving E-stability results. It has been established that E-stability
governs stability under adaptive learning. See Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Chapter
12.
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IV.3 General Existence and E-stability of SSE
This section presents the existence and stability results for the general model
Eq.(1), featuring heterogeneous beliefs. I first present the existence and stability
results for a general case with N sunspots and then give the simpler cases. I will
comment where my results extend to the more general case with a mix of more
sunspot observers. To set up the general results, I assume N + 1 groups of agents
denoted from Ω0 to ΩN that partition the total population Ω. Denote γ0, γ1 · · · γN as
the proportions for each group and
∑
γi = 1. The information set for each group is
as follows:
Iωt =
 ∅ if ω ∈ Ω0st,k if ω ∈ Ωk
Without loss of generality, I assume γ1 < γ2 < · · · < γN . Agents in Ω0 estimate
the steady state to be α0 where agents in Ωk for k > 0 estimate yt = αki when
the kth sunspot is at state i. Let wki = αki − ŷ where ŷ is the unique steady
state for the model. Also let β = F ′(ŷ) where F = H ◦ G. Define two index sets:
I1 = {i ∈ {1, · · · , N}||β| > γ−1i }, and I2 = {i ∈ {1, · · · , N}|β < −γ−1i }.
Theorem 1
Stochastic sunspot equilibrium (SSE) exists if and only if I1 6= ∅; E-stable
SSE exists if and only if I2 6= ∅.
I make a few comments about the existence and stability results. First, stable
sunspots can exist when agents coordinate on different sunspots. Second, the
existence region decreases when the largest population of sunspot observers reduces.
Third, in the limit when there is only one type of SSE believers, i.e., γN = 1, the
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results match the previous literature1. The location SSE solutions depend on whether
the model’s linearity and the sunspot processes themselves. To make the results more
concise, I define two mappings, Rl and Rn, from a population index to a restriction
that partially locates the sunspot solution.
Rl(k)→
 πk11wk1 + πk22wk2 = 0 if πk11 + πk22 − 1 = (γkβ)−1wk1 = 0, wk2 = 0 if πk11 + πk22 − 1 6= (γkβ)−1
Rn(k)→
 wk1 = w̄k1, wk2 = w̄k2 if πk11 + πk22 − 1 < (γkβ)−1wk1 = 0, wk2 = 0 if πk11 + πk22 − 1 ≥ (γkβ)−1
where w̄k1 and w̄k2 are two non-zero real numbers.
IV.3.1 Linear Model
If both H(y) and G(y) are linear functions in y, then we call it a linear model.
Note that F (y) = H(G(y)) is also a linear function. I present the following theorem
for the location of the E-stable SSE.
Theorem 2
Given I2 6= ∅, there exist a continuum of E-stable SSE solutions
{(w0, w11, w12, · · · , wN1, wN2) ∈ R2N+1|w0 = 0,Rl(1), · · · ,Rl(N)}
at least for some k ∈ {1, · · · , N}, the transition probability of the sunspot
process satisfies the resonant frequency condition πk1 +πk2−1 = (γkβ)−1.
1Literature has found that in a similar model with only one type of sunspot observers, SSE exists
if and only if |β| < 1, and E-stable SSE exists if and only if β < −1.
89
IV.3.2 Nonlinear Model
If either H(y) or G(y) are nonlinear functions in y, then we call the model is
a nonlinear model. Recall that we assume F = H ◦ G : R → R is three times
continuously differentiable in a neighborhood of ŷ. Further F ′(ŷ) 6= 0 and F ′′(ŷ) 6= 0.
I present the following theorem.
Theorem 3
Given I2 6= ∅, there exist a single= E-stable SSE solution
{(w0, w11, w12, · · · , wN1, wN2) ∈ R2N+1|w0 = 0,Rn(1), · · · ,Rl(N)}
at least for some k ∈ {1, · · · , N}, the transition probability of the sunspot
process satisfies the serial correlation condition πk1 + πk2 − 1 < (γkβ)−1.
IV.4 Proof of the Existence and E-stability Results
The proofs of the theorems in the previous sections are illustrated in two simple
cases of the model. The results are presented in two simple cases of the model. There
is only one sunspot process in the first case, and each agent is either an SS believer or
an SSE believer. There are two sunspot processes in the second case, and each agent
is either an SSE-1 believer or an SSE-2 believer. I comment where the steps in the
proof extend to the general case.
IV.4.1 SSE Believers v.s. SS Believers
Consider the case where there is only one sunspot process {st} with transition
matrix (πij). There is a mix of SS believers and SSE believers. The temporary
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t [G(yt+1)|I it ]), (IV.2)
where γ0 is the proportion of SS believers and γ1 is the proportion of SSE believers.
γ0 +γ1 = 1. Assume that SSE believers have perceived law of motion (PLM) yt = α1i
where i = st, and that SS believers have restricted PLM yt = α0. The mapping
from the set of PLMs to the projected actual law of motion (ALM) is given by the
following equation system. See Appendix I.3. for the derivation the projected ALM.








γ1H(π11G(α11) + π12G(α12)) + γ0F (α0)
γ1H(π21G(α11) + π22G(α12)) + γ0F (α0)
γ1(p̄1H(π11G(α11) + π12G(α12)) + p̄2H(π21G(α11) + π22G(α12)) + γ0F (α0)

where p̄1 = π21/(π21 + π12) and p̄2 = π12/(π21 + π12), and (p̄1, p̄2) is the unique
stationary distribution of the sunspot process st for state 1 and state 2. Let
α = (α11, α12, α0)
′. The differential equation defining E-stability is dα
dτ
= T (α) − α.
For SSEs near a steady state, some useful results are implied by analysis of the
linearization of the differential equation at the steady state.. Appendix I.4 shows

























Here ẇi = dwi/dτ , and Ψi(w11, w12, w0) denote the nonlinear parts. Note that Π̃ in
fact is a transition probability matrix. The eigenvalues of Π̃ are 0 , 1, and γ1(π11 +
π22 − 1). Thus, the eigenvalues of the linear map A are λ1 = −1, λ2 = β − 1,
λ3 = γ1β(π11 + π22 − 1)− 1.
Linear case
If the model is linear, Ψi(w11, w12, w0) contains only zeros. We only need to focus on
the matrix A. If |β| > (γ1)−1, then (γ1β)−1 ∈ (−1, 1), then there exist (πij) such that
π11 + π22 = (γ1β)
−1 + 1 ∈ (0, 2) which implies λ3 = 0, and A is not full rank. The
model has a SSE solution only if matrix A is not full rank, and there exist a continuum
of SSE solutions which are characterized by Aw̄ = 0. Moreover, if β < −(γ1)−1 then
both λ1 = 0 and λ2 = β − 1 are negative. If the Markov sunspot process satisfies
restriction π11 + π22− 1 = (γ1β)−1, then λ3 = γ1β(π11 + π22− 1)− 1 = 0. There exist
a continuum of SSE solutions which are characterized by Aw̄ = 0, which implies
(γ1βπ11 − 1)w̄11 + γ1β(1− π11)w̄12 + γ0βw̄2 = 0
γ1β(1− π22)w̄11 + (γ1βπ22 − 1)w̄12 + γ0βw̄2 = 0
These two equations can simply to (1 − π22)w̄11 + (1 − π11)w̄12 = 0 and w̄2 = 0,
which locates the continuum which represents the SSE solutions are E-stable under
learning. Hence the special case of Theorem.(1) where γ2 = · · · = γN = 0 holds true
for the linear case.
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I make a few comments about the existence result for the linear model. First, note
the condition for existence can also be written as |γ1β| > 1, and recall the existence
condition in the standard representative-agent model is |β| > 1. The proportion
parameter γ1 directly modifies the slope of the linear model in a multiplicative way.
Intuitively, a γ1 proportion of the agent population forms expectations of the future
states, and their expectations affect today with a magnitude order of β. These SSE
believers generate feedback at level γ1β. Second, the resonant frequency condition is
modified by the proportion parameter γ1 compared to its counterpart in a standard
representative-agent model. Third, the continuum set does not depend on γ1, the
proportion of agents who believe in sunspots. In the SSEs, the restrictions on w11
and w12 are identical to the restriction found in Evans and Honkapohja (2003a), and
the only difference is that the steady-state believers think yt is always at the steady-
state of the model ŷ. Finally, the existence region shrinks as γ1 becomes smaller, which
aligns with the intuition that if fewer agents coordinate on the sunspot, SSEs are less
likely to exist. The stability result extends naturally from Evans and Honkapohja
(2003a). In the limit when there are only SSE believers, i.e., γ1 = 1, theorem 2
matches the stability results found in previous literature. Note that if there is a mix
of SSE believers and SS believers, the slope of the linear function β has to be more
negative than the counterpart with representative agents for there to exist E-stable
SSEs. A substantial negative slope β is required for the model to have stable SSE if
the proportion of SSE believers, γ1, is small.
Nonlinear case
The analysis for the nonlinear case is more complicated than the linear model. The
proof relies on a local bifurcation analysis of the differential equation. The bifurcation
arises when the linear part of the system has a zero eigenvalue, i.e. λ3 = 0 or
π11 + π22 − 1 = (γ1β)−1. Note that I am able to set eigenvalue λ3 to be zero with
the condition β < −(γ1)−1. Appendix I.5 proves that if β < −(γ1)−1, E-stable SSEs
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exist near the steady state. Treating π22 as a fixed number, I vary π11 to achieve
bifurcation. Let π̄11 = 1 + (γβ)
−1 − π22 and v = π11 − π̄11. The bifurcation occurs at
v = 0. It follows that E-stable SSEs exist for v < 0. Note that v < 0 implies λ3 > 0.
If v > 0, the SSEs are not E-stable, and learning instead converges to the fundamental
solution. Note that the sharp-edged resonant frequency condition is no longer needed.
Specifically, if the transition matrix (πij) is such that π11 + π22 − 1 < (γ1β)−1 there
exist an SSE near the steady-state. In particular, this result emphasizes the artificial
nature of resonance frequency.
IV.4.2 SSE-1 Believers v.s. SSE-2 Believers
In this section, I consider the special case of the model where γ0 = 0 and N = 2.
I comment when appropriate how the stability result extends to the more general case
where there are more processes and SSE believers. Two types of agents are called
SSE-1 believers and SSE-2 believers. The temporary equilibrium depends on “the







The following equation system gives the mapping from the set of PLMs to the
projected actual law of motion (ALM). Appendix I.6 derives the following T-map

























































































stationary distributions of sunspot processes sjt for state 1 and state 2. Let α =
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(α11, α12, α12, α22)
′. The differential equation defining E-stability is dα
dτ
= T (α) − α.
The model can be transformed to deviation from steady state form with wi = αi − ŷ
for i ∈ {11, 12, 21, 22}. Appendix I.7 shows that the linearized system at the steady













 , Ψ =

Ψ11(w11, w12, w21, w22)
Ψ12(w11, w12, w21, w22)
Ψ21(w11, w12, w21, w22)
Ψ22(w11, w12, w21, w22)









































Here ẇi = dwi/dτ , and Ψi(w11, w12, w21, w22) denote the nonlinear parts. Note that Π̃
in fact qualifies as a transition probability matrix, and I will explore the implication









22 − 1). Thus, the eigenvalues of the linear map A are λ1 = γ1β(π111 +
π122 − 1)− 1, λ2 = γ2β(π211 + π222 − 1)− 1, λ3 = −1, and λ4 = β − 1.
Linear Case




−1 +1 ∈ (0, 2) which implies λi = 0 and A is not full rank. The model
has a SSE solution only if matrix A is not full rank, and there exist a continuum of
SSE solutions which are characterized by Aw̄ = 0. Moreover, if β < −(γ1)−1 then
both λ3 = 0 and λ4 = β − 1 are negative. If the Markov sunspot process satisfies
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restriction πi11 + π
i
22 − 1 = (γiβ)−1, then λi = γiβ(πi11 + πi22 − 1) − 1 = 0. There
exist a continuum of SSE solutions which are characterized by Aw̄ = 0, which implies
(1− πi22)w̄11 + (1− πi11)w̄12 = 0 for i ∈ I2 and w̄j = 0 for j /∈ I2
Nonlinear Case
For the nonlinear case, Appendix I.9 shows some extra technical difficulties in proving
the theorem. Specifically, one needs to set both eigenvalues λ3 and λ4 to be zero
simultaneously for the bifurcation to arise. The proof of stability leads to a system of
two differential equations interdependent in order 3 or higher in the center manifold. I
prove that the system’s stability result only depends on the linear and quadratic parts
of the function, and thus we can analyze the two differential equations separately.
The proof for the special case where γ0 = 0 and γi = 0 ∀i > 0. Note that the





22−1)−1 where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. It follows that there would
be N serial correlation conditions, and if one of the conditions is satisfied, there exists
a continuum of SSE solutions. The resonant frequency condition associated with a
specific sunspot process depends on the proportion of the agents who observe that
sunspot variable. For the nonlinear model’s proof of stability, the bifurcation would
happen at N points instead of 2 points. The proof of stability would also lead to a
system of N differential equations that are still interdependent in order 3 or higher
in the center manifold.
IV.5 An Example: OLG Model
This section provides a standard version of the Samuelson overlapping
generations (OLG) model of money that treats heterogeneous beliefs with care. The
purpose of this section is to demonstrate the general existence and E-stability results
with simulations in a micro-founded model. Assume there is a continuum of agents
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who live two periods of time. Each agent supplies labor in their first period of life
and consumes in the second period. The only asset in the economy is money, and the
money aggregate supply M = 1, which is fixed over time. The utility maximization
problem of agent ω is
max
nt(ω)




Each agent is small, and the market is competitive, and thus each agent takes the
price pt as given. The expectation operator is sub-scripted with ω which means that
the expectation is held specifically by agent ω. Assume functional forms V (n) = n
1+ε
1+ε
and U(c) = c
1−σ−1
1−σ . Define the following a new variable yt = p
− ε+1
ε+σ
t . The temporary
equilibrium (TE) can be computed as follows. Appendix I.10 shows the derivation of
the TE. yt =
∫
ω
H(Eωt G(yt+1))dω where H(y) = y
1
ε+σ and G(y) = y
(ε+σ)(1−σ)
ε+1 . Define
the compounded function F (y) = H(G(y)) = yβ, where β = (1 − σ)/(ε + 1). Note
that now the model is in the same form as Eq.(IV.1). I also consider the linearized
version of the model, where the linearization happens at the steady state ŷ = 1. The
linearized versions of functions H and G and the implied compounded function are
written as H̃(y) = 1+ 1
ε+σ
(y−1), G̃(y) = 1+ (ε+σ)(1−σ)
ε+1
(y−1), and F̃ (y) = 1+β(y−1).
IV.5.1 Simulations
I present five sets of configurations of the OLG model summarized in table (1).
The first four simulations confirm the analytic results found in this paper for both
linear and nonlinear cases. The last set of simulations shows a general example
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of 9 sunspot processes with SS believers and 9 groups of SSE believers. All of
the simulations are implemented with a small constant gain of 0.05 instead of the
decreasing gain of 1
t
as stated in the model.
Configuration
Simulation N γ0 Linearity
I 1 > 0 Linear
II 1 > 0 Nonlinear
III 2 = 0 Linear
IV 2 = 0 Nonlinear
V 9 > 0 Nonlinear
TABLE 1 Five Sets of Simulations
Simulation I
This set of simulations are shown in Figure (1). I make the following parameter choices
for the first set of simulations. ε = 1 and σ = 11 so that β = (1− σ)/(ε + 1) = −5.
Also γ1 = 0.25. The transition probability matrix for the sunspot process is set with
the following values π11 = 0.15+v and π22 = 0.05. I consider three different values for
v. v− = −0.1, v0 = 0, and v+ = 0.1. The values for ν are set so that when ν = ν0, the
knife-edged resonant frequency condition γ1β(π11 +π22−1)−1 = 0 is satisfied. Initial
values for belief coefficients α = (α11, α12, α0) are set to be (1.001, 0.999, 1.001) which
is different from but in the neighborhood of the steady-state solution (1.0, 1.0, 1.0). In
the left columns, the blue lines represent the evolution of SSE believers estimates α11,
α12, and the red line represents the evolution of SS believers estimate α0. The first
row shows the case where v < 0, and there is an explosive root, which means there
are no E-stable solutions. The second row corresponds to the case where the knife-
edged resonant frequency condition is met, and the system converges to a point in the
continuum specified by (1−π22)(α11−1) = −(1−π11)(α12−1) and α0 = 1. The third
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FIGURE 1. Linear Model with SS Believers and SSE Believers
Note: The first column shows the evolution for the belief components α = (α11,
α12, α0), which are located from top to bottom in each graph on the left hand side.
Three rows of simulations correspond to cases where v is v−, v0, and v+ respectively.
row shows the case where v > 0, and the only E-stable solution is the fundamental
solution (1, 1, 1). The simulation matches the prediction by the existence and E-
stability results.
Simulation II
This set of simulations from the nonlinear model is shown in Figure (2). Parameter
choices are the same as simulation I. Two rows correspond to the case ν−, and ν+,
respectively. With ν−, there exists an E-stable SSE, which matches the simulation
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in the first row. Note that when the model is nonlinear, the restriction on the
sunspot process’s correlation is no longer knife-edged. With ν+, the only E-stable
solution is steady state, shown in the second row. Initial values for belief coefficients
α = (α11, α12, α0) are set to be (1.01, 0.99, 1.01) which is different from but in the
neighborhood of the steady state. In the left columns, the blue lines represent the
evolution of α11, α12, and the red line represents the evolution of α0.





















































FIGURE 2. Nonlinear Model with SS believers and SSE believers
Note: The first column shows the evolution for the belief components α11, α12,
α0, which are from top to bottom in each graph on the left-hand side. Two rows of
simulations correspond to cases where v is v−, and v+ respectively.
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Simulation III
This set of simulations are shown in Figure (3) with two types of SSE believers: SSE-1
and SSE-2. The model is linearized around the steady state. I make the following
parameter choices: ε = 1 and σ = 21 so that β = −10. Also the proportion of SSE-1
and SSE-2 agents are γ1 = 0.2, γ2 = 0.8. The transition probability matrix for the
first sunspot process is π111 = 0.25 + v1, π
1
22 = 0.25 and for the other sunspot process
is π211 = 0.5+v2 and π
2
22 = 0.375. Consider v
+
j = 0.1 and v
0
j = 0 for j = 1, 2. Consider














2 ), which are shown in Figure
(3) from top to bottom. Initial values for belief coefficients α = (α11, α12, α21, α22)
are set to be (1.005, 0.995, 1.01, 0.99). The blue lines and red lines represent the
belief components of SSE-1 and SSE-2 believers respectively. I ignore the cases that
involve vj < 0 because in these cases the dynamic is explosive according to E-stability
principle, a result that has been found in the previous literature. The stable SSE are
shown in the first three rows where at least one of ν’s is zero. When v1 > 0 and
v2 > 0, then the only E-stable solution is the fundamental solution.
Simulation IV
This set of simulations from the nonlinear model are shown in Figure (4). Parameter













2 ), which are shown in Figure (4) from top to bottom. Note that when v1
and v2 are both negative, there exists an E-stable SSE of order 4. When only one of
the v′s is negative, and the other one is positive, there exists an E-stable of SSE of
order 2. When neither v′s are negative, the only E-stable solution is the fundamental
solution.
Simulation V
This simulation is shown in Figure (5) from a general case with SS believers and
9 groups of SSE believers in a nonlinear model. I make the following parameter
































































































































































FIGURE 3. Linear Model with SSE1 and SSE2 Believers
the group of SS believers) accounts for 10% of the population, i.e. γj = 0.1 for all
j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 10}. The probability transition matrix for the sunspot processes Πj are
set as πj11 = 0.225 + 0.025 ∗ j + νj and π
j
22 = 0.525− 0.025 ∗ j. Note that the general
theorems predict that SSE-j agents learn that the economy evolve according to the
observed sunspot if νj < 0, and learn that the economy is at the steady state if νj > 0.
To confirm this prediction, I divide the 9 groups of SSE believers into two categories.
In the simulation, the first five groups of SSE believers have vj < −0.1 (blue lines),
and the last four groups of SSE believers have vj = 0.1 (red lines). The black line in
the middle represents the SS believer in the middle. I use a small constant gain equal
































































































































































FIGURE 4. Nonlinear Model with SSE1 and SSE2 Believers













2 ) respectively. The left column shows the evolution of beliefs α =
(α11, α12, α21, α22) which are shown from top to bottom in each graph on the left
hand side.
IV.6 Selection Dynamics
This section explores whether the agents favor the sunspot equilibrium by
introducing model selection dynamics based on Branch and Evans (2006.) In the
previous environment, agents are divided into different groups based on the forecast
models they use. I also have exogenously set the proportion of each group. In a more
realistic setting, agents may choose between a list of models and base their selection on
their relative forecast performances. The advantage of adding the selection mechanism
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FIGURE 5. Nonlinear Model with SS Believers and 9 Types of SSE Believers
Note: The top graph shows the evolution of the agents’ beliefs. The blue lines
correspond to the groups of SSE believers with vj < 0, and the orange lines correspond
to the groups of SSE believers with vj > 0
is that the model can now endogenously sort agents into different groups. In the model
with SSE believers and SE believers, this experiment investigates whether agents will
choose the SSE rule, SE rule, or both. This is the special case where N = 1. The
selection mechanism pitch the sunspot equilibrium believers against the steady-state
believers to compete based on forecasting accuracy.
The selection dynamics are added to the same standard version of the Samuelson
overlapping generations (OLG) model of money that treats heterogeneous. Agents
form real-time estimates formed via recursive least squares (RLS) and choose the
forecasting rule based on unconditional mean squared errors for variable y. There
is dual learning as agents recursively update their forecasting model parameters and
evolve their predictor choice according to a dynamic predictor selection mechanism.
Predictor proportions are updated according to the discrete choice probabilities. The
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fitness based on mean square errors of the two predictors j ∈ {0, 1} are estimated by
Φ̂j,t = Φ̂j,t−1 + δt(−(yt − Êj,t−1yt)2 − Φ̂j,t−1)
where 0 < δt < 1. The mean squared errors map into predictor proportions according











The intensity parameter ξ governs how sensitive the agents are to the relative
sizes of the accuracy measures. If ξ = 0, then γj,t =
1
2
which means the proportion
for each group is the same. If ξ → ∞, then γj,t is 1 or 0 depends on whether Φj,t is
the largest or not.
I am interested in whether γj,t converges to some level. Figure (6) illustrates
numerically that sunspot equilibrium can be stable when the predictor proportion is
determined endogenously under real-time learning. I make the following parameter
choices for the first set of simulations. ε = 1 and σ = 11 so that β = (1−σ)/(ε+1) =
−5. The transition probability matrix for the sunspot process is set with the following
values π11 = 0.15 and π22 = 0.05. I initialize the proportion of SS believers γ0,0 = 0.
The initial values for (α11, α12, α2) = (1.2, 0.8, 1). This setup means that not only
all agents start with using the steady-state forecasting rule, but also they start with
the correct estimate. The proportion parameter is held constant until the 1000th
period to gather a history of data so that accuracy measures can be computed for
each forecasting model.
Figure (6) shows the simulation with a large intensity parameter ξ = 400. Also
δ = 0.001. The simulation converges to a state where all agents use the forecasting
rule based on the sunspot, and the sunspot forecasting rule is consistently better
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than the steady-state rule. The intuition for this is that the threshold for the sunspot
equilibrium to be stable is γ̃1 = 0.25. When the proportion starts to change at 1000,
γ1,1000 jumped from 0 to around 0.4, which surpasses the threshold γ̃1 for the sunspot
equilibrium to be stable. A large proportion of agents start using the SSE rule at
time 1000 because when all agents are forced to use the SS forecasting rule, both of
the estimates for α11 and α12 will stay at 1.
FIGURE 6. Selection Dynamic I
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A key observation here is that the SSE forecast model nests the SS model. The
intuition is also straightforward - the nesting model can perform as well as the nested
model even when the economy is around the steady state. With a finite intensity
parameter, half of the agents will eventually use the SSE model. As long as 1/2
passes the threshold implied by the model calibration, the SSE model will start to
become a stable equilibrium under learning. Eventually, all agents will use the SSE
model. Recall the calibration used in the simulation implies the threshold is 0.25.
What happens if the calibration is changed so that the threshold is larger than
0.5? I run the following simulation to demonstrate this scenario. The simulation in
Figure (7) is based on a similar calibration except that now I change σ from 11 to
13
3
. Now the new proportion threshold γ̃1 for the SSE to be stable is 0.75. Since the
threshold for the SSE solution to be stable is higher now, the SSE believers eventually
learn the steady state α11 = α12 = 0.
IV.7 Conclusion
Self-fulling outcomes of pessimism or optimism have significant macroeconomic
implications. The studies of sunspot equilibria try to formalize this important
phenomenon. One criticism of SSE literature is that self-fulling solutions are a highly
coordinated outcome that is unlikely to rise in the real world. The literature on
the existence and stability of sunspot equilibria has always assumed a representative
agent. It fails to provide a robustness check that sunspot equilibria can exist when
agents coordinate on different extrinsic information sets. This paper presents a direct
response to this criticism. I show that the economy can evolve according to different
sunspots, even if only a proportion of the agents participate in the coordination.
They do not need to all coordinate on the same sunspot process. Besides, I provide
the necessary and sufficient conditions under which SSE exists and is stable under
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FIGURE 7. Selection Dynamic II
learning. This paper also confirms that agents choose the SSE rule over the SS rule
with a suitable initial setup with model selection dynamics.
On the other hand, I find that the parameter space for SSE to exist is smaller in
a model with belief heterogeneity than a representative-agent model. The stability
region for these SSEs also shrinks accordingly. These findings have important
implications. For the RBC-type models studied by Farmer and Guo (1994) that
explain business cycle co-movements with SSE, this paper suggests that the existence
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region could be smaller than what has been found. The stability could be harder
to come by. An open question is whether SSEs would still arise in calibrated non-
convex RBC models such as the two-sector model in Benhabib and Farmer (1996) and
the model with non-separable utilities in Bennett and Farmer (1999). For the New
Keynesian literature that warns of the dangers of sunspot equilibria from a poorly-
designed monetary policy, this paper suggests that the “safe region” where SSEs do
not arise can be larger than what has been previously thought. The literature so far
suggests the interest rule be such that the model has a slope of more than −1, so
SSEs are not stable under learning. This paper finds that the threshold might be
much lower than −1 if we are willing to assume that some agents do not observe any
sunspots in the first place or that agents observe different sunspots.
This paper is the first to study indeterminacy when agents are heterogeneous
in beliefs. The recent development in macroeconomics modeling has witnessed a
shift from a representative agent framework to one that carefully treats agent-level
heterogeneity, especially income/wealth heterogeneity in models featuring incomplete
markets. See Mckay et al. (2016), Kaplan et al. (2018), and Bhandari et al. (2019.)
One recommendation for future research is to study indeterminacy under interactions
between income heterogeneity and belief heterogeneity.
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APPENDIX
I.1 Derivation of the FOC of a Household
The inter-temporal condition for the profit maximization problem specified in






































C1(pt(ω), pt−1(ω)) = −φ
pt(ω)− pt−1(ω)
p2t−1(ω)
C2(pt+1(ω), pt(ω)) = φpt+1(ω)pt(ω)
pt+1(ω)− pt(ω)
p3t (ω)
Substituting these equations into Eq.(I.1) and assuming the equilibrium is symmetric
pt(ω) = Pt















+ φΛt = φβEtΛt+1
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where Λt is the shadow price for the intermediate-good producers
Λt = C
−σ
t Πt(1 + Πt)
I.2 Derivation of the FOC of an Intermediate Firm
The inter-temporal condition for the profit maximization problem specified in





































C1(pt(ω), pt−1(ω)) = −φ
pt(ω)− pt−1(ω)
p2t−1(ω)
C2(pt+1(ω), pt(ω)) = φpt+1(ω)pt(ω)
pt+1(ω)− pt(ω)
p3t (ω)
Substituting these equations into Eq.(I.1) and assuming the equilibrium is symmetric
pt(ω) = Pt















+ φΛt = φβEtΛt+1
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where Λt is the shadow price for the intermediate-good producers
Λt = C
−σ
t Πt(1 + Πt)
I.3 SS v.s. SSE: Derivation of the Projected ALM
SS believers and SSE believers form expectations based on their PLMs as follows.
Ê1tG(yt+1) =
 π11G(α11) + π12G(α12) if st = 1π21G(α11) + π22G(α12) if st = 2
Ê2tG(yt+1) = G(α0)
Combining the expectations and Eq.(1), one obtains the ALM. Recall F (·) = H(G(·))
yt =
 γ1H(π11G(α11) + π12G(α12)) + γ0F (α0) if st = 1γ1H(π21G(α11) + π22G(α12)) + γ0F (α0) if st = 2
The SS believers do not observe the sunspot process and therefore regard the deviation
from the steady state as white noise. Solving Πp̄ = p̄. for p̄ = (p̄1, p̄2)
′, the
stationary distribution of the sunspot process, one obtains p̄1 = π21/(π21 + π12) and
p̄2 = π12/(π21 + π12) From the SS believers’ perspective, they see yt evolves around
the steady state as follows.
T2(α0) =p̄1(γ1H(π11G(α11) + π12G(α12)) + γ0F (α0)) +
p̄2(γ1H(π21G(α11) + π22G(α12)) + γ0F (α0))
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For the SSE believers, the ALM matches their PLM, and therefore no projection is








γ1H(π11G(α11) + π12G(α12)) + γ0F (α0)
γ1H(π21G(α11) + π22G(α12)) + γ0F (α0)
γ1(p̄1H(π11G(α11) + π12G(α12)) + p̄2H(π21G(α11) + π22G(α12)) + γ0F (α0)

I.4 SS v.s. SSE: Linearization of Differential Equation at the
Steady State
Let wi = αi − ŷ and ẇi = dwi/dτ , and Ψi(w11, w12, w0) are the nonlinear part.











































































I.5 Proof for SS v.s. SSE in Nonlinear Model
Define the following variables for bifurcation.
π̄11 = 1 + (γ1β)
−1 − π22
v = π11 − π̄11
The dynamic system is now written as
ẇ11 = γ1(π̄11 + v)F (ŷ + w11) + γ1(1− π̄11 − v)F (ŷ + w12) + γ0F (ŷ + w0)− w11 − ŷ
ẇ12 = γ1(1− π22)F (ŷ + w11) + γ1π22F (ŷ + w12) + γ0F (ŷ + w0)− w12 − ŷ
ẇ0 =
γ1(1− π22)
1− (γ1β)−1 + v
F (ŷ + w11) +
γ1(1− π̄11 − v)
1− (γ1β)−1 + v
F (ŷ + w12) + γ0F (ŷ + w0)− w0 − ŷ
At w11 = w22 = w0 = v = 0, the coefficient matrix of the linear part is A = βΠ̃− I,






0 F ′ − 1 0
0 0 0






with a = 1−π22(γ1F
′)
(1−π22)(γ1F ′) , and b = 1 − γ
−1
1 . Let q
ij denote the elements of Q−1. Define










This transformation implies w11 = bx11 + x12 + ax0, w12 = bx11 + x12 + x0, and
w0 = x11 + x12. One obtains ẋi = Gi(x11, x12, x0, v) for i ∈ {11, 12, 2} where
Gi(x11, x12, x0, v)
=qi1 [γ1(π̄11 + v)F (ŷ + w11) + γ1(1− π̄11 − v)F (ŷ + w12) + γ0F (ŷ + w0)− w11 − ŷ]




1− (γ1β)−1 + v
F (ŷ + w11) +
γ1(1− π̄11 − v)
1− (γ1β)−1 + v
F (ŷ + w12) + γ0F (ŷ + w0)− w0 − ŷ
]
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Apply the transformation for wi, we have
Gi(x11, x12, x0, v)
=qi1[γ1(π̄11 + v)F (ŷ + bx11 + x12 + ax0) + γ1(1− π̄11 − v)F (ŷ + bx11 + x12 + x0)+
γ0F (ŷ + x11 + x12)− (bx11 + x12 + ax0)− ŷ]
+qi2[γ1(1− π22)F (ŷ + bx11 + x12 + ax0) + γ1π22F (ŷ + bx11 + x12 + x0)+




1− (γ1β)−1 + v
F (ŷ + bx11 + x12 + ax0) +
γ1(1− π̄11 − v)
1− (γ1β)−1 + v
F (ŷ + bx11 + x12 + x0)+
γ0F (ŷ + x11 + x12)− (x11 + x12)− ŷ]
Augmenting this system with v̇ = 0 leads to a four-dimensional system for which the
equations for ẋ0 and v̇ have zero linear parts and the equation for ẋ11 and ẋ12 have
linear parts −x11 and (F ′ − 1)x12 which are obviously stable. We now use the center
manifold theory. In particular, the system has an invariant center manifold which can
be represented by a three times continuously differentiable function x11 = h11(x2, v)
and x12 = h12(x2, v) with hi(0, 0) = 0 and Dhi(0, 0) = 0 for i ∈ {11, 12}. Local
stability of the system is governed by local stability of the “projected system”,
ẋ0 = G2(h11(x2, v), h12(x2, v), x0, v)
v̇ = 0
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The second-order expansions are






F ′′(b2x211 + x
2
12 + a
2x20 + 2bx11x12 + 2abx11x0 + 2ax12x0)










0 + 2bx11x12 + 2bx11x0 + 2x12x0)





F ′′(x211 + x
2
12 + 2x11x12)
h11(x2, v) = c11x
2
2 + d11x2v + f11v
2 +O11(||(x0, v)||3)
h12(x2, v) = c12x
2
2 + d12x2v + f12v
2 +O12(||(x0, v)||3)
where F ′′ = F ′′(ŷ) and =̇ denotes equality up to O(||(x11, x12, x0)||3). Also, note that
q31 = (a− 1)−1, q32 = (1− a)−1, and q33 = 0. It follows that on the center manifold







(1 + a)x22 +O(||(x2, v)||3) (I.1)
For the purpose of the theorem we are at liberty to choose π22 so that a 6= −1 which
we now assume. The bifurcation occurs at v = 0. It follows that E-stable SSEs
exist for v < 0. If v > 0 the SSEs are not E-stable and learning instead converges
to the fundamental solution. It is evident that the system exhibits a transcritical
bifurcation at v = 0. The 2SSEs are defined by the equations x̄11 = 0, x̄12 = 0, and
x̄0 = − 2γ1(F
′)2
F ′′(1+a)
v. In terms of the original variables, w̄11 = ax̄0, w̄12 = x̄0, and w̄0 = 0.
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I.6 SSE1 v.s. SSE2: derivation of the T-map















for j ∈ {1, 2}. Combining the expectations and Eq.(1), one obtains the ALM. Recall






















































t ) = (2, 2)
SSE1 believers and SSE2 believers do not observe each other’s sunspot process. The

















12). From the SSE
1 believers’ perspective, they see yt evolves
according to s1t as follows.
yt =
 γ1H(π111G(α11) + π112G(α12)) + p̄21γ2H(π211G(α21) + π212G(α22)) + p̄22γ2H(π221G(α21) + π222G(α22)) if s1t = 1γ1H(π121G(α11) + π122G(α12)) + p̄21γ2H(π211G(α21) + π212G(α22)) + p̄22γ2H(π221G(α21) + π222G(α22)) if s1t = 1




 p̄11γ1H(π111G(α11) + π112G(α12)) + p̄12γ1H(π121G(α11) + π122G(α12)) + γ2H(π211G(α21) + π212G(α22)) if s2t = 1p̄11γ1H(π111G(α11) + π112G(α12)) + p̄12γ1H(π121G(α11) + π122G(α12)) + γ2H(π221G(α21) + π222G(α22)) if s2t = 2
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I.7 SSE1 v.s. SSE2: linearization at the steady state
Let wi = αi − ŷ and ẇi = dwi/dτ , and Ψi(w11, w12, w21, w22) are the nonlinear













































































































where the nonlinear part is
Ψ =

Ψ11(w11, w12, w21, w22)
Ψ12(w11, w12, w21, w22)
Ψ21(w11, w12, w21, w22)
Ψ22(w11, w12, w21, w22)

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I.8 Proof of Linear Model.
Throughout this proof, I assume 0 < γ1 < γ2 < 1 without losing generality,
and therefore −γ−11 < −γ−12 < −1. If |β| > (max(γ1, γ2))−1 = γ−12 , then (γ2β)−1 ∈
(−1, 1). There exist (π2ij) such that π211 + π222 = (γ2β)−1 + 1 ∈ (0, 2) which implies
eigenvalue λ4 = 0. Note that A is not a full-rank matrix, and therefore the model has
a SSE solution, and there exist a continuum of SSE solutions which are characterized
by Aw̄ = 0. If β < −(max(γ1, γ2))−1 = −γ−12 then both λ1 = 0 and λ2 = β − 1 are
negative. Consider the following two cases
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1. −γ−11 < β < −γ−12 . Note that λ3 = γ1β(π111 + π122 − 1) − 1 < 0. If the
Markov sunspot process satisfies restriction π211 + π
2
22 − 1 = (γ2β)−1, then λ4 =
γβ(π11 + π22 − 1) − 1 = 0. There exist a continuum of E-stable SSE solutions
which are characterized by Aw̄ = 0 which locate the continuum with restrictions
w̄11 = w̄12 = 0 and (1− π222)w̄21 + (1− π221)w̄12 = 0.










−1, then lambdaj+2 = 0 and λ−j+2 < 0. There exist a continuum of
E-stable SSE solutions which are characterized by Aw̄ = 0 which locate the
continuum with restrictions (1− πj22)w̄j1 + (1− π
j
j1)w̄j2 = 0 and w̄−j1 = w̄−j2 =
0.If both resonant frequency conditions are satisfied then λ3 = λ4 = 0. There
exist a continuum of E-stable SSE solutions which are characterized by Aw̄ = 0
which locate the continuum with restrictions (1 − π122)w̄11 + (1 − π121)w̄12 = 0
and (1− π222)w̄21 + (1− π221)w̄12 = 0.
I.9 Proof of Nonlinear Model.
Throughout this proof, I assume 0 < γ1 < γ2 < 1 without losing generality,
and therefore −γ−11 < −γ−12 < −1. If F ′ < −(max(γ1, γ2))−1 = −γ−12 then both
λ1 = 0 and λ2 = F
′ − 1 are negative. Let F ′ = F ′(ŷ). First, consider the case where
−γ−11 < F ′ < −γ−12 . Note that λ3 = γ1F ′(π111 +π122− 1)− 1 < 0. Define the following
variables for bifurcation.






The following analysis is similar to the proof shown in Appendix ??. Note that the
differential equations for the transformed variables x11, x12, and x21 would have stable
linear parts −x11, (F ′−1)x12 and (γ1F ′(π111 + π̄122−1)−1)x21. The bifurcation occurs
at v2 = 0. It follows that E-stable SSEs exist for v2 < 0. If v2 > 0 the SSEs are
not E-stable and learning instead converges to the fundamental solution. v2 < 0
corresponds to π211 + π
2
11 − 1 < (γ2F ′(ŷ))−1.
Now assume F ′ < −γ−11 < −γ−12 . If only one of the sunspot processes satisfies
πj11 + π
j
22 − 1 < (γjβ)−1 and the other sunspot process has serial correlation π
−j
11 +
π−j22 − 1 > (γ−jβ)−1, one can define the following variables for bifurcation.







This case is also similar to the analysis shown in Appendix A.4. The bifurcation
occurs at vj = 0. It follows that E-stable SSEs exist for vj < 0. If both sunspot
processes satisfies πj11 + π
j
22 − 1 < (γjβ)−1, one can define the following variables for
bifurcation.
π̄111 = 1 + (γ1F
′(ŷ))−1 − π122 and v1 = π111 − π̄111
π̄211 = 1 + (γ2F
′(ŷ))−1 − π222 and v2 = π211 − π̄211
122
The differential equation system is now written as
ẇ11 = γ1(π̄
1
11 + v1)F (ŷ + w11) + γ1(1− π̄111 − v1)F (ŷ + w12)+
γ2(1− π222)
1− (γ2F ′(ŷ))−1 + v2
F (ŷ + w21) +
γ2(1− π̄211 − v2)
1− (γ2F ′(ŷ))−1 + v2
F (ŷ + w22)− w11 − ŷ
ẇ12 = γ1(1− π122)F (ŷ + w11) + γ1π122F (ŷ + w12)+
γ2(1− π222)
1− (γ2F ′(ŷ))−1 + v2
F (ŷ + w21) +
γ2(1− π̄211 − v2)
1− (γ2F ′(ŷ))−1 + v2
F (ŷ + w22)− w12 − ŷ
ẇ21 =
γ1(1− π122)
1− (γ1F ′(ŷ))−1 + v1
F (ŷ + w11) +
γ1(1− π̄111 − v1)
1− (γ1F ′(ŷ))−1 + v1
F (ŷ + w12)+
γ2(π̄
2
11 + v2)F (ŷ + w21) + γ2(1− π̄211 − v2)F (ŷ + w22)− w22 − ŷ
ẇ22 =
γ1(1− π122)
1− (γ1F ′(ŷ))−1 + v1
F (ŷ + w11) +
γ1(1− π̄111 − v1)
1− (γ1F ′(ŷ))−1 + v1
F (ŷ + w12)+
γ2(1− π222)F (ŷ + w21) + γ2π222F (ŷ + w22)− w22 − ŷ
At w11 = w12 = w21 = w22 = v1 = v2 = 0, the coefficient matrix of the linear part is
A = F ′(ŷ)Π̃− I, whose eigenvalues are −1, F ′ − 1, 0, and 0 where F ′ = F ′(ŷ). The
diagonalization of A is given by
A = Q

−1 0 0 0
0 F ′ − 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
Q
−1, where Q =

b 1 a1 0
b 1 1 0
1 1 0 a2





and b = −γ2/γ1. Let qij denote the elements of Q−1. Define
new variables xi as (x11, x12, x21, x22)




w11 = bx11 + x12 + a1x21
w12 = bx11 + x12 + x21
w21 = x11 + x12 + a2x22
w22 = x11 + x12 + x22
One obtains ẋi = Gi(x11, x12, x21, x22, v1, v2) as follows for i ∈ {11, 12, 21, 22}






Apply the transformation for wi, we have
Gi(x11, x12, x21, x22, v1, v2) =
qi1[γ1(π̄
1
11 + v1)F (ŷ + bx11 + x12 + a1x21) + γ1(1− π̄11 − v1)F (ŷ + bx11 + x12 + x21)+
γ2(1− π222)
1− (γ2F ′(ŷ))−1 + v2
F (ŷ + x11 + x12 + a2x22)+
γ2(1− π̄211 − v2)
1− (γ2F ′(ŷ))−1 + v2
F (ŷ + x11 + x12 + a2x22)
− (bx11 + x12 + a1x21)− ŷ]
+qi2[γ1(1− π122)F (ŷ + bx11 + x12 + a1x21) + γ1π122F (ŷ + bx11 + x12 + x21)+
γ2(1− π222)
1− (γ2F ′(ŷ))−1 + v2
F (ŷ + x11 + x12 + a2x22)+
γ2(1− π̄211 − v2)
1− (γ2F ′(ŷ))−1 + v2
F (ŷ + x11 + x12 + a2x22)
− (bx11 + x12 + x21)− ŷ]
+qi3[
γ1(1− π122)
1− (γ1F ′(ŷ))−1 + v1
F (ŷ + bx11 + x12 + a1x21)+
γ1(1− π̄111 − v1)
1− (γ1F ′(ŷ))−1 + v1
F (ŷ + bx11 + x12 + x21)+
γ2(π̄
2
11 + v2)F (ŷ + x11 + x12 + a2x22) + γ2(1− π̄211 − v2)F (ŷ + x11 + x12 + x22)
− (x11 + x12 + a2x22)− ŷ]
+qi4[
γ1(1− π122)
1− (γ1F ′(ŷ))−1 + v1
F (ŷ + bx11 + x12 + a1x21)+
γ1(1− π̄111 − v1)
1− (γ1F ′(ŷ))−1 + v1
F (ŷ + bx11 + x12 + x21)+
γ2(1− π222)F (ŷ + x11 + x12 + a2x22) + γ2π222F (ŷ + x11 + x12 + x22)
− (x11 + x12 + x22)− ŷ]
Augmenting this system with v̇1 = 0 and v̇2 = 0 leads to a six-dimensional system
for which the equations for ẋ21, ẋ22, v̇1, v̇2 have zero linear parts and the equation
for ẋ11 and ẋ12 have linear parts −x11 and (F ′ − 1)x12 which are obviously stable.
We now use the center manifold theory. In particular, the system has an invariant
center manifold which can be represented by a three times continuously differentiable
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function x11 = h11(x21, x22, v1, v2) and x12 = h12(x21, x22, v1, v2) with hi(0, 0, 0, 0) = 0
and Dhi(0, 0, 0, 0) = 0 for i ∈ {11, 12}. Local stability of the system is governed by
local stability of the “projected system”,
ẋ21 = G21(h11(x21, x22, v1, v2), h12(x21, x22, v1, v2), x21, x22, v)
ẋ22 = G22(h11(x21, x22, v1, v2), h12(x21, x22, v1, v2), x21, x22, v)
v̇1 = 0 and v̇2 = 0
The second-order expansions are












21 + 2bx11x12 + 2a1bx11x21 + 2a1x12x21)










21 + 2bx11x12 + 2bx11x21 + 2x12x21)












22 + 2x11x12 + 2a2bx11x22 + 2a2x12x22)










22 + 2x11x12 + 2x11x22 + 2x12x22)



















11x22v2 + r11x21x22 + s11v1v2+
O11(||(x21, x22, v1, v2)||3)



















12x22v2 + r12x21x22 + s12v1v2+
O12(||(x21, x22, v1, v2)||3)
where F ′′ = F ′′(ŷ) and =̇ denotes equality up to O(||(x11, x12, x21, x22)||3). Also,
note that q31 = (a1 − 1)−1, q32 = (1 − a1)−1, q33 = 0, q34 = 0, and q41 = 0, q42 = 0,
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q43 = (a2−1)−1, q44 = (1−a2)−1. It follows that on the center manifold the differential


















22 +O(||(x21, x22, v1, v2)||3)
For the purpose of the theorem we are at liberty to choose π122 and π
2
22 so that a1 6= −1
and a2 6= −1 which we now assume. Notice that the differential equations for ẋ21 and
ẋ22 are in fact decoupled in the linear and quadratic part and only higher-order parts
are coupled. It is evident that the two systems exhibit a transcritical bifurcation at
v1 = 0 and v2 = 0 respectively. It follows that E-stable SSEs exist for v1 < 0 and




and x̄22 = − 2γ2(F
′)2
F ′′(1+a2)
v2. In terms of the original variables we have w̄11 = a1x̄21,
w̄12 = x̄21, w̄21 = a2x̄22, and w̄22 = x̄22.
I.10 Derivation of the Temporary Equilibrium











nt(ω)dω = 1 (I.3)
where Eq.(I.2) is the first order condition for the agent of index ω, and Eq.(I.3) is the























Define a new variable yt = p
− ε+1
ε+σ











where H(y) = y
1
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